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Problem Description
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of service scenarios and corresponding service portfolios.
Important research questions:
- How can scenarios be used to represent business models and business strategies?
- How can the scenarios be analyzed qualitatively and quantitatively?
- How can the business actor positions be analyzed in the scenarios?
- How can the relations between business actors be analyzed through modeling?
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Abstract
The last decades in the communication and IT industry have been influ-
enced by the introduction of numerous new business actors and technological
systems. They have brought with them a wide variety of business actors
operating on different levels of the value chain, or together in complex value
constellations. Old platform specific standards have started to fade away,
and new platforms with more streamlined layers have appeared. These new
platforms are part of the Next Generation Network (NGN). Services of this
network utilize a number of service enablers. The new service platforms
deliver services to the end user as a set of service portfolios.
The new NGN communication and IT services are heterogeneous in two ways;
technologically and business-wise. Technologically, they consist of pervasive
and ubiquitous services, run by heterogeneous and distributed service plat-
forms. Business-wise, multiple business actors with a variety of business
models cooperate to produce the services. Valuation of these new hetero-
geneous NGN communication and IT services has proved to be challenging.
Forecasting of demand and acceptance is difficult due to limited historical
experience. The interacting business actors and their variety of business ac-
tors also bring with them conflicts of interest. In addition to the challenge
of getting their technical systems to work together, they have to agree on a
revenue share agreement to share the revenue from the co-produced services.
The purpose of this thesis has been to perform a business analysis of a com-
munication and IT service portfolio, with an emphasis on business actor
positions and incentives. To make well informed investment decision regard-
ing such service portfolios, it is vital to valuate the projects quantitatively.
To account for and compare different business situations and market devel-
opment, scenarios are used. These scenarios need to describe business actor
relations and strategies.
This thesis proposes a quantitative model framework (CF model) for the
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analysis of a communication and IT service portfolio. The model is based
on the work of Langøygard (2006) and Zoric & Lassen (2005). Relevant
technical and economic theory is researched to provide a sound background
for the model. Two new aspects are included in the model; bargaining power
and revenue share. The model developed evaluates a content provisioning
portfolio, where the bargaining power of the content providers is important
to the outcome of the project. This bargaining power is important because
it decides the price of the service enablers provided by the content providers.
The revenue share agreement is important because it decides each business
actor’s share of the revenue from the services sold, and because it affects the
incentives of all business actors.
A proof-of-concept test is conducted to test the functionality of the model
and to investigate the profitability of the service portfolio subject to val-
uation. The test shows that the model functions as intended, accounting
for aspects such as user acceptance, demand, market development, and the
relation between business actors.
The results from the model suggest that the valuated service portfolio is prof-
itable to all business actors for most of the market developments. The results
also show that the content providers are better off when their concentration
is low and when they have built up barriers to entry by participating in the
service platform cooperation. This is because these factors increase their bar-
gaining power and enables them to charge a higher mark up over marginal
cost. This higher mark up more than outweighs the costs of participating in
the service platform.
The model results also show that a solution acceptable to most business
actors can be reached with most of the scenarios. The scenarios include a
net present value threshold for some business actors to account for strategic
considerations. The new revenue share functionality has to redistribute the
revenue in some of the original solutions to reach a feasible solution. Further-
more, the new revenue share functionality is shown to align the incentives of
the participating business actors.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Background
The last decades in the communication and IT industry have been influ-
enced by the introduction of numerous new business actors and technolog-
ical systems. In the past, the telecommunications industry in each country
was normally dominated by one firm. This firm controlled all parts of the
value chain, and operated a state regulated monopoly of telecommunication
services (Dodd 2005). The services were homogenous with network and ap-
plication specific standards, systems and capabilities integrated at channel
or customer point.
The Telecommunication Act of 1996, and similar acts across the world, was
the beginning of a new era. The networks of the state regulated monopolies
were opened up to other firms, and mandatory unbundling was enforced in
many areas (Dodd 2005). This brought with it a wide variety of business
actors operating on different levels of the value chain, or together in com-
plex value constellations. Old application specific standards started to fade
away, and new platforms with more streamlined layers appeared. The new
platforms were integrated at solutions or assembly layer, and allowed for a
number of business and system actors to cooperate in the production of a
service. These new platforms are part of what is called the Next Generation
Network (NGN). Services of this network are collected in service platforms,
where each service requires a set of enabling services. The platform delivers
services to the end user as a set of service portfolios.
2
1.2. PROBLEM STATEMENT
The new NGN communication and IT services are heterogeneous in two ways;
technologically and business-wise. Technologically, they consist of pervasive
and ubiquitous services, run by heterogeneous and distributed service plat-
forms. Business-wise, multiple actors with a variety of business models co-
operate to produce services. These actors make up a complex value network
that interacts to implement the value creation.
Valuation of these new heterogeneous NGN communication and IT services
has proved to be challenging. Forecasting of demand and acceptance is diffi-
cult due to limited historical experience. The interacting business actors and
their variety of business models also bring with them conflicts of interest. In
addition to the challenge of getting technological systems to work together,
agreeing on the revenue share agreement is vital to the realization of services
with multiple business and system actors.
1.2 Problem Statement
The purpose of this thesis is to perform a business analysis of a communi-
cation and IT service portfolio. A Next Generation Network (NGN) service
platform is studied. This platform delivers services to the end user as a set
of service portfolios. The platform is made up of a number of services and
service enablers, which can be provided by a number of business and system
actors.
To make a well informed investment decision regarding such NGN service
platforms and services, it is important to valuate the platform quantitatively.
With a number of business and system actors involved, this is a complex
task. This thesis seeks to develop a quantitative model for such a valuation.
The goal is to create a model that takes as input information regarding the
users, the system and technical model, and the business situation to perform
a valuation. This input takes the form of general variables and different
scenarios specifying scenario-specific input.
The quantitative model in this thesis is based on the work of Langøygard
(2006), Zoric (2005), and Zoric & Lassen (2005). Their work developed mod-
els for the valuation of heterogeneous service platforms. The work in this
thesis attempts to extend and improve their models to account for impor-
tant aspects of heterogeneous business situations. One important question
is how the varying incentives and bargaining power of each business actor
influence the revenue share agreement. Moreover, this thesis tries to answer
3
1.3. SCOPE
the following important research questions:
• How can scenarios be used to represent business models and business
strategies?
• How can the scenarios be analyzed qualitatively and quantitatively?
• How can the business actor positions be analyzed in the scenarios?
• How can the relations between business actors be analyzed through
modeling?
1.3 Scope
The goal of this thesis is to develop a quantitative model for the valuation of
heterogeneous communication and IT service portfolios. In order to create
this model, the supporting economic and technical theory is investigated.
Relevant theory is presented and explained briefly. Risk is accounted for by
the use of scenarios describing different input variables. It is out of scope for
this thesis to account for risk through the use of financial portfolio theory.
This thesis develops a technical model of the service portfolio, and an eco-
nomic model for the valuation of the portfolio. These two models are tightly
coupled. The formal technical representation of the service portfolio is im-
portant to the valuation. How the underlying technology is adapted by the
market is important to the evaluation, but the technical specification of the
technology is not. Hence, the specification of this technology is out of scope
for this thesis.
1.4 Methodology
The work conducted for this thesis consists of two main parts. The first part
is the investigation of relevant economic and technical theory surrounding
service platforms and their markets. This theory needs to be understood
in order to determine which factors influence the valuation of the platform.
Technical theory needs to be researched to enable a sound specification of
4
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the platform structure and technology. Economic theory needs to be inves-
tigated to identify the economic and market mechanisms that will influence
the valuation.
The researched theory provides the basis for the quantitative model. The
valuation model is Microsoft Excel-based and contains several phases. Each
phase takes the calculations one step closer to the result. The model is
developed iteratively, by first developing a basic model and then introducing
more aspects and calculations for every new iteration. Only the final model
is presented in this thesis. The models of Langøygard (2006) and Zoric &
Lassen (2005) have influenced the work of this thesis.
1.5 Project Outline
This chapter provides a brief introduction to the history and market of com-
munication and IT services. It also presents the problem statement, defines
the scope of the work, and describes the methodology used to solve the prob-
lem. Chapter 2 presents the technical theory necessary to understand the
concept of service platforms and the components such platforms consist of.
It also specifies the service portfolio that is the subject of valuation, and how
this portfolio is linked to business and system actors.
Chapter 3 presents the economic theory necessary to perform the quantitative
valuation and develop the model. Furthermore, the strategy concepts that
influence the way the business actors cooperate and interact to determine
the revenue share agreement are presented.
Chapter 4 presents and discusses the different scenarios that are valuated.
The scenarios take the form of different input parameters to the model. Chap-
ter 5 presents the cash flow maximization model that has been developed.
The model is described by its different phases, each performing important
calculations. These phases represent separate work sheets of the Excel model.
Chapter 6 presents the results that have been obtained from the scenario
valuations. The quantitative results are discussed, and a qualitative evalua-
tion of the scenarios is performed. Chapter 7 presents the conclusion of this
thesis. Areas for future work are also suggested.
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Chapter 2
Technical Background
The main purpose of this thesis is to perform an economic valuation of a
service portfolio through creating a valuation model framework. But to un-
derstand what is being valuated, it is important to understand the underly-
ing technical concepts. There is also an important relationship between the
technical system and the business situation that should be understood before
proceeding to study the model itself.
2.1 Introduction
This chapter introduces the technical theory that is necessary to understand
the model developed. The cash flow maximization model quantitatively de-
termines the value of participating in the co-production of services. There
are several technical terms and concepts that are important to understand
what the model valuates. Among these are service platforms, service port-
folios, services and service enablers. This chapter explains these concepts.
Furthermore, there are business aspects that are tightly coupled with the
technical aspects. For instance, the technical situation is important to how
the business actors interact. An examination of the relation between the
technical system and the business situation is conducted in this chapter.
The concept of service portfolios is quite recent, and a result of an ongoing
development in the IT and communication industry. This chapter presents a
brief summary of the historical development. Services have been delivered by
the communication industry for many years, and explaining the development
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towards the service portfolios of today provides a good background for this
thesis.
After having explained the historical development, a more thorough expla-
nation of the technical concepts is given. The service platform itself and the
system components and business actors involved in it are described.
Since the model in this thesis is developed to valuate service portfolios, the
specific service portfolio that is the subject of valuation is presented in this
chapter.
2.2 Historical Development
Telecommunication services have been around for a while, but the type of
services and the way they are delivered has changed greatly over the years.
The change has been especially rapid during the last two decades. Histori-
cally, the telecommunication industry was dominated by one firm in national
monopolies. The dominating firm, called the incumbent, was owned by the
government or ran a state regulated monopoly. The incumbents controlled
all parts of the physical infrastructure, such as the switching centrals and the
copper wire connecting households and companies to the network. Because
the incumbents were the only firms with access to this infrastructure, they
also controlled the services delivered through it. All services were developed,
produced, distributed and delivered by the dominating firm (Dodd 2005).
During the 1990s and early in the new millennium, most monopolized na-
tional telecommunication industries experienced a softening of the regulation.
In the United States, the Telecommunications Act of 1996 became the turn-
ing point of the industry. In Europe, governments also decided to soften up
the regulation (Dodd 2005). The new regulatory scheme often introduced
mandatory unbundling, forcing the incumbents to give other business ac-
tors access to their network components. The idea behind the unbundling
was that it would facilitate competition among telecommunication providers,
and eventually enable competitors to the incumbents to build their own net-
works (Hausman 2005).
This new regulatory scheme brought with it a number of new business ac-
tors. The introduction of these competitors has dramatically changed the
telecommunications landscape. Firstly, a number of new and more complex
services have been introduced. Secondly, the new business actors have to
9
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cooperate to deliver many of these new services. They own different parts of
the network infrastructure and have different capabilities. These have to be
combined to produce and deliver services.
Figure 2.1: Evolution from vertical integration to horizontal layering, based on
Boman (2001).
Before the deregulation, the incumbent handled all stages of service produc-
tion and delivery. Hence, there was no need for publicly specified interfaces
and certified standards. The services were delivered through service “stove
pipes”. Standards were network and application specific, integrated at chan-
nel or customer point. Service production and delivery was vertically inte-
grated. Many of the new applications however, have been decoupled from
the underlying infrastructure. They are also forcing the development of open
standards and agreed upon interfaces. The traditional vertical business and
technology segmentation is being transformed into one with a horizontally
layered service environment, where the new services can be provided over any
underlying network technology (Boman 2001). This development is shown
in Figure 2.1.
2.3 Service Platforms
The new services created through the cooperation between different business
actors are often heterogeneous services. The term heterogeneous comes from
the fact that these services consist of several components and service types.
These service types could be video and audio, positioning and content, and
10
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Figure 2.2: Services (top) requiring service enablers (bottom)
so forth. The service types require service enablers. The main purpose of
such a service enabler is to offer a re-usable building block for the creation
of innovative services. A service enabler may have been a service, but as the
services evolved it instead became a helper service for other services and as
such a service enabler (Ericsson 2006).
Figure 2.3: Service platform including all components
As business actors have different capabilities and control different network
functionality, they provide different service enablers. To allow for a co-
production of services by using the service enablers of other business actors,
the services are often produced in service platforms. Service platforms are an
11
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environment for services and applications to operate in, with standardized
access to the communication layers. They act as the providers of service
enablers (Zhdanova, Zoric, Marengo, Kranenburg, Snoeck, Sutterer, Ra¨ck,
Droegehorn & Arbanowski 2006).
Another term that needs to be explained is service portfolio. A service port-
folio is a portfolio of services within the service platform. Such portfolios can
be used to group services by functionality or customer value. An example
of a service platform, complete with services, service enablers and service
portfolios, is given in Figure 2.3.
2.4 PATS Service Platform
This section introduces the PATS (Platform for Advanced Telecommunica-
tion Services) service platform that is used in this thesis. PATS is the result
of a research agreement between the Norwegian University of Science and
Technology (NTNU), Ericsson, Telenor and Hewlett-Packard. The vision of
PATS is “to create a virtual centre of excellence on advanced heterogeneous
services and fast service development..” (tPATS Portal 2007). In other words,
PATS is a research and test platform for new heterogeneous services.
A subset of the services in the PATS service platform is used as input to the
cash flow maximization model (CF model) in this thesis. The CF model is
developed to be as generic as possible, but it is tested with the PATS input.
The purpose of this proof-of-concept test is to analyze the functionality of the
model. Using an established set of services from the PATS service platform
suits this purpose.
After several years of research and service development, the PATS service
platform contains a large set of services. A subset of the available services is
chosen for two reasons. Firstly, it makes the quantitative valuation easier to
follow. After all, the focus is the model functionality and not the complexity
of the input. Secondly, the model requires an input aligned with the research
questions it seeks to answer. The model attempts to account for different
business situations and the bargaining power of the participating business
actors. Hence, the model requires an input with differing business situations
and bargaining power.
A content provisioning service portfolio fits the above two purposes. Such a
service portfolio is focused around the delivery of content-based services. Ex-
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amples of such services are guiding tool-based services, content sharing, and
content manipulation. All such services require a Content Provision service
enabler. However, different content provisioning services may require differ-
ent types of content. Consequently, there is one type of Content Provision
service enabler for each type of content. The number of content providers in
such a service portfolio may vary, but the number of other business actors
is constant. This brings with it an interesting business situation, discussed
further in Chapter 3.
Langøygard (2006) uses the PATS service platform as input to his models.
This thesis uses a subset of these services, more specifically the ones that
require the Content Provision service enablers. Seven of these services are
identified, listed and described in the next section. Through choosing these
services, a content provisioning service portfolio is obtained. In the remainder
of the text, the chosen service portfolio is referred to as the Service Portfolio.
The service portfolio used in Langøygard’s model does not contain specific
Content Provision service enablers. However, it does contain a Content De-
livery service enabler. The functionality of this enabler overlaps with the
Content Provision service enabler introduced in the Service Portfolio. Hence,
the Service Portfolio used in this thesis does not include the Content Delivery
service enabler used by Langøygard. Furthermore, the service composition
presented in Table 2.1 has been modified based on Zoric (2007) to better fit
the composition of the PATS platform.
This thesis introduces three new service enablers. These are:
• Content Provision (Context-Based)
• Content Provision (Sharing)
• Content Provision (Information)
In brief, the Service Portfolio used herein does not contain the Content Deliv-
ery service enabler used by Langøygard, but introduces the three new service
enablers listed above. The portfolio is described in greater detail in the
following sections. Note that the Service Portfolio may include more service
enablers than the ones described in this thesis, such as service discovery. The
components of the Service Platform significant to the valuation, however, are
all included.
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2.4.1 Services and Service Enablers
As has been noted, services require service enablers. This is also the case
for the services of the Service Portfolio. This section presents the service
enablers and services of the Service Portfolio. The descriptions are adapted
from Langøygard (2006).
The service enablers of the Service Portfolio are:
1. (SE1): Network service enabler. This is a vital service enabler for all
the services, as it provides the physical transfer of data between the
users and the service producers. As can be seen from Table 2.1, all
services use this service enabler.
2. (SE2): Context service enabler. Context is any information that char-
acterizes the situation of an entity (Abowd, Dey, Brown, Davies, Smith
& Steggles 1999). With IT and communication services, context is of-
ten used meaning location, which is a vital component for many new
services. In order to provide the user with services that are specifically
adapted to the situation, the ability to determine the location of the
user can be important. Some technologies used to determine the loca-
tion of mobile terminals are RFID, GPS, UMTS and Wi-Fi positioning
techniques.
3. (SE3): Service Composition service enabler. This service enabler in-
tegrates all the service enablers that are part of a service into an end
product that can be delivered to the user. It makes sure that the all
the components of the service work together in a proper way. As with
SE1, this service enabler is required by all services.
4. (SE4): Quality of Service service enabler. This service enabler mon-
itors the performance of the other service enablers. It controls the
quality of service parameters through admission control and other QoS
mechanisms.
5. (SE5): A4C service enabler. This service enabler takes care of au-
thentication, authorization, accounting, auditing and charging (A4C).
Authentication identifies the two parties involved; the service provider
and the users, possibly using an identity obtained from another service
enabler. Authorization involves checking whether the user has permis-
sion to access the service requested. Accounting, auditing and charging
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are mechanisms that are needed to charge users the proper amount for
their use of the services.
6. (SE6): Identity Management service enabler. This service enabler man-
ages the individual user profiles, containing information such as user
preferences and passwords.
7. (SE7): Content Provision (Context-Based) service enabler. This ser-
vice enabler delivers context-based content. Such content is influenced
by the context of the user.
8. (SE8): Content Provision (Sharing) service enabler. This service en-
abler delivers content to content-based services that depend on the
sharing of content between users, or between users and the service.
9. (SE9): Content Provision (Information) service enabler. This service
enabler delivers information content, such as news.
The services of the Service Portfolio are:
1. (S1): Location Based services. Location based services are services that
provide information and content based on the location of the user.
2. (S2): Guiding Tool services. These services provide the users with
guiding tools, such as maps showing directions or points of interest
nearby.
3. (S3): Presence Information services. Presence information is a status
indicator that indicates the availability and willingness to communicate
of a user of the service. This service stores and communicates such
information to other users of the service.
4. (S4): Content Manipulation services. Content manipulation services
allow users to manipulate content through using this service. The con-
tent could either be supplied by the service or provided by the user.
5. (S5): Content Sharing services. These services allow users to share con-
tent. Such content could be text documents, pictures or presentations.
6. (S6): News services. News services supply the users of the service
with news content. News content could be news broadcasts or online
newspapers.
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7. (S7): Point-of-Interest (POI) services. A point-of-interest is a location
that could be of interest to the user. POI services supply the users
with information about such locations. These location could be nearby
hotels, stores or museums.
All the services listed above require a set of service enablers. Table 2.1 shows
which service enablers that each service requires.
Si SE1 SE2 SE3 SE4 SE5 SE6 SE7 SE8 SE9
S1 x x x x x x
S2 x x x x x x
S3 x x x x x x x
S4 x x x x x
S5 x x x x
S6 x x x x
S7 x x x x x x
Table 2.1: Service composition table.
2.4.2 Business Actors
One of the purposes of service platforms is that several business actors come
together to co-produce the services. Technically, this means that service
enablers can belong to different business actors. This is an essential property
of service enablers that is vital to the CF model. This section presents the
business actors involved in the co-production of services.
More specifically, a particular service enabler belongs to a particular system
actor. This actor has specific capabilities and assets that enable it to deliver
the service enabler. Hence, a system actor is a separate system entity. A
business actor is separate business entity. A business actor can represent
one or more system actors. By representing a system actor, the business
actor handles the service enablers of this system actor. Note that system
actor is an abstract concept, and not a real business entity. In the Service
Portfolio of this thesis, each system actor is represented by a separate business
actor. This means that each service enabler is controlled by a separate firm.
Consequently, only the term business actor is used from now on.
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Service Provider (BA1)
The Service Provider is an important actor to the Service Portfolio because
it has the main responsibility of composing the services from the different
service enablers. It also takes care of the interaction with the users of the
services, and handles the collection of revenue. This revenue has to be dis-
tributed to the other business actors through a revenue share agreement,
and this distribution is the responsibility of the service provider. The Service
Provider is the only business actor that has contact with the users directly,
and the users might not even be aware of the other business actors.
The Service Provider owns two service enablers; Service Composition service
enabler, and A4C service enabler.
Context Provider (BA2)
Context is any information that can be used to characterize the situation
of an entity (Abowd et al. 1999). When considering communication and IT
services the most commonly used context information is the location of the
user. Another example of context information is the history of user events,
which can be used to adapt services to the preferences of the user.
The Context Provider handles context information, and owns the Context
Provision service enabler.
Network Provider (BA3)
The Network Provider is the business actor controlling the network through
which the services are delivered. It can control one or more networks, pos-
sibly also different types of networks. Some common network types in the
communication and IT industry are WLAN, GSM, UMTS and PSTN. The
Network Provider controls the network logic and the physical infrastructure.
The Network Provider owns the Network and Quality of Service service en-
ablers.
17
2.4. PATS SERVICE PLATFORM
Identity Provider (BA4)
Certain services depend on the identity of the user requesting them. The
Identity Provider handles the identity information of each user. It also has the
responsibility to securely store such information. Upon request, the identity
information is provided to the service production through the service enabler
of the Identity Provider.
The Identity Provider owns the Identity Management service enabler.
Content Provider (BA5→)
With the Service Portfolio being a content provisioning service portfolio, this
is a very important business actor. All the services in the portfolio require
some sort of content, and this must be delivered by a Content Provider.
The Content Providers are different from the other business actors in two
ways. Firstly, there are three service enablers that are owned by Content
Providers. Secondly, there may be more than one Content Provider taking
part in the co-production of services. Consequently, each type of Content
Provision service enabler could be owned by one or more different Content
Providers. For example, there may be two Content Providers both owning a
Content Provision (Context-Based) and Content Provision (Sharing) service
enabler, while there is a third and different Content Provider that owns the
Content Provision (Information) service enabler.
The service enablers Content Provision (Context-Based), Content Provi-
sion (Sharing), and Content Provision (Information) are owned by Content
Providers.
The number of Content Providers and which service enablers they own is de-
scribed for each scenario in Chapter 4. The Content Providers are numbered
as the business actors from 5 and upwards.
2.4.3 Service Composition
The service composition is the act of composing a service through combining
different service enablers. The business actors provide the necessary service
enablers to the composition, and the Service Provider has the main responsi-
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Figure 2.4: UML Use Case diagram of business actors composing and delivering
service
19
2.4. PATS SERVICE PLATFORM
bility through the Service Composition service enabler. Figure 2.4 illustrates
a service composition involving all business actors and service enablers of
the Service Portfolio. The service composition is necessary to produce the
heterogeneous services of the Service Portfolio.
The number of service enablers needed, and hence the number of business
actors, differs from service to service. Some require a majority of the service
enablers, while others require only a few.
Figure 2.5: UML MSC of service composition for Service 1
UML Message Sequence Charts (MSCs) are a good way of illustrating how
the service composition works in greater detail. Figure 2.5 shows the service
composition for S1. We see that the user requests Service 1 from the Ser-
vice Provider. The service provider requests the necessary service enablers
from the other business actors, which return these. Following this, the ser-
vice provider integrates these into a service through its Service Composition
service enabler. The process is similar for all services of the Service Portfo-
lio, but with changing business actors involved. Note that the MSC shows
the most important phases of the service composition. There may be more
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steps included, but the diagram includes the phases important to the Service
Portfolio valuation.
Figure 2.6: UML MSC of service composition for Service 6
Figure 2.6 shows the service composition for Service 6. As can be seen from
the figure, this is a less complex service requiring fewer service enablers than
Service 1. The composition starts the same way as in Figure 2.5, with the
user requesting a service from the Service Provider. As before, the Service
Provider requests the necessary service enablers from the other business ac-
tors. The main difference is that another set of service enablers is needed for
this service.
2.4.4 UML Class Diagrams
To provide an accurate description of the Service Portfolio, the following has
been modeled by UML class diagrams:
• The service enablers, Figure A.1
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• The services, Figure A.2
• The business actors, Figure A.3
• The service/service enabler relationship, Figure A.4 and Figure A.5
All these UML class diagrams can be found in Appendix A.
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Chapter 3
Economic Theory
This chapter presents and discusses the economic theory necessary to perform
the valuations in the model developed. The model relies on certain key
microeconomic concepts, such as the relationship between price and demand,
certain strategic concepts, such as the concept of bargaining power, and other
concepts such as regulation and the adoption of services in a population.
These concepts and other necessary topics are discussed in this chapter.
The cash flow maximization model (CF model) developed in this thesis is
based on the models created by Langøygard (2006) and Zoric & Lassen
(2005). Some new modules are added to the model, some are slightly modi-
fied, and others are adopted without modification. The theory necessary to
support the new modules is studied in detail in this chapter. Theory relevant
to the adopted models is also discussed.
3.1 Microeconomic Theory and Strategy
3.1.1 Microeconomic Concepts
This section presents and discusses the key microeconomic concepts that are
relevant to the Service Portfolio valuation and the CF model.
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Price/Demand Relationship
In an economy, there are producers of goods and services, and consumers
of these. Throughout the following explanation, the term goods is used to
denote both goods and services. In an economic setting, a supply and de-
mand model describes the interaction between producers and consumers in
the market for a certain good. The supply and demand relationship is fun-
damental to microeconomics. In a perfectly competitive market, the demand
is determined by the price of the good (Schotter 2001). It is this interaction
that is critical to the quantitative model developed.
To explain the interaction between price and demand, this thesis relies on the
classic economic concept of the demand curve. The demand curve represents
graphically the relationship between the price set by the producers of a good,
and the quantity demanded by consumers. The alternative interpretation is
that the firm produces a certain quantity, and gets a price depending on this
quantity. However, the most natural interpretation for communication and
IT firms is that they set the price, and this interpretation is used in the rest
of this thesis. Demand curves can be used to represent the consumption of
a good by an individual consumer, or the total demand in a market for a
certain good.
Figure 3.1: Price/demand relationship
Figure 3.1 provides an illustration of a demand curve, where the quantity of
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goods demanded by consumers is inversely proportional to the price set by
the producer. The figure shows how the demand for a certain good changes
as its price changes. The quantity of goods demanded depends on the utility
function of the consumers, but this concept is not discussed in further detail.
For a more thorough discussion of utility and utility functions, the reader
can refer to Schotter (2001).
Referring to Figure 3.1, we can see that the maximum quantity demanded is
qmax, this happens when the price p = 0. The price pmax denotes the price
above which there is no demand for the good. Between these two points,
the demand varies linearly. The producer faces a downward sloping demand
curve, where the demand for the good is inversely proportional to the price.
The price p1 gives a demand of q1. A decrease in the price to p2 gives an
increase of the demand to q2. The relationship between price and demand
with a linear demand curve is as follows:
Q(p) =
(
1− p
pmax
)
qmax, 0 ≤ p ≤ pmax
Elasticity of Demand and the Lerner Index
The elasticity of demand is an important property of demand functions, and
it can also tell us something about the market power of a firm. Elasticity
of demand measures the sensitivity of consumer demand for a product to
changes in its price. More precisely, the elasticity of demand measures the
percentage change in the demand for a good that results from a given per-
centage change in its price (Schotter 2001). Formally, the price elasticity of
demand can be expressed:
ε = −%∆Q
%∆P
= −
dQ
Q
dP
P
= −dQ
dP
P
Q
If a situation with a monopolist facing linear demand P (Q) = A − bQ is
considered, we can find the optimal output by setting marginal revenue equal
to marginal cost (Schotter 2001). The resulting equation with the optimal
price, Pm, and quantity, Qm, becomes:
Pm
(
1 +
dP (Qm)
dQ
Qm
Pm
)
=MC(Qm)
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Substituting the price elasticity of demand into the above equation and re-
arranging yields the Lerner index (L)
L =
(
Pm −MC(Qm)
Pm
)
=
1
ε
The interpretation of the Lerner index is discussed in the following sections.
3.1.2 Strategy and Bargaining Power
Church & Ware (2000) state the following about business strategy and the
theory of industrial organization:
The focus of the new industrial organization on the conduct of
firms in imperfectly competitive markets involves determining the
factors and strategies that provide firms with a competitive ad-
vantage. With its focus on the nature and form of rivalry in
concentrated markets, much of industrial organization is a theory
of business strategy.
Bear in mind that another frequently used term for industrial organization is
applied microeconomics. Microeconomic theory and the theory of industrial
organization have a close relationship to strategic theory and the concept
of bargaining power. This section examines the strategic concepts that are
relevant to the Service Portfolio valuation and the CF model.
Market Power
An important topic in business strategy and industrial organization is the
concept and determinants of market power. Remember from classical mi-
croeconomics that a firm in a perfectly competitive market will price its
goods at marginal cost. Such firms act as price-takers; their price is defined
by the market. These firms have no market power. On the other hand, a
firm has market power if it finds it profitable to raise prices above marginal
cost (Church & Ware 2000).
The Lerner index is defined as the ratio of the firm’s profit margin Pm −
MC(Qm) and its price. The index is a measure of market power because
it measures how much a firm can increase its price over marginal cost. The
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Lerner index also shows that for a monopolist, the market power depends
on the elasticity of demand. The greater the elasticity of demand, the less
is the mark up over marginal cost, and hence market power. The inverse is
also true.
For any given firm, the market power depends on the extent to which con-
sumers can substitute to other suppliers. This substitution can be supply side
substitution, where the consumers can switch to other producers of the same
product, or demand side substitution, where consumers can switch to accept-
able substitutes. In general, a firm may have market power even though it
is not a monopolist. The extent to which a firm can exercise market power
in imperfectly competitive markets depends on the elasticity of its demand
curve (Church & Ware 2000).
For a firm to be able to execute and sustain its market power in the long run
there must be impediments to entry. If there were not, other firms would
enter the market to extract the surplus (Schotter 2001). Porter (1980) lists
the following barriers to entry
• Economies of scale
• Product differentiation
• Capital requirements
• Switching costs
• Access to distribution channels
• Cost disadvantages independent of scale
• Government policy
This thesis discusses which of these that are relevant to service platforms in
the following sections. First, a strategic evaluation framework will need to
be presented.
Strategic Evaluation Framework
The theory of market power and the strategy related to it is comprehensive,
and the discussion is limited to the aspects relevant to service platforms.
To be able to discuss these aspects, a framework for strategic evaluation
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is needed. Such a framework proves useful when discussing the structural
characteristics of service platforms.
Figure 3.2: Porter’s Five Forces of Competition (Porter 1980)
In an industry, or between the participating business actors in a service plat-
form, competitive forces could drive down the return on invested capital
towards the competitive floor rate of return. Hence, it is important to eval-
uate these competitive forces. Porter has identified five competitive forces -
entry, threat of substitution, bargaining power of buyers, bargaining power
of suppliers, and rivalry among industry competitors (Porter 1980). These
five forces of competition are illustrated in Figure 3.2.
The framework of Figure 3.2 is often used to assess industries and their
attractiveness. It is not the intention of this thesis to assess the overall
attractiveness of the communication and IT industry. Rather, the focus is
on investigating the business opportunity that service platforms constitute
for the participating business actors. The business actors participating in a
service platform have formed what can be seen as a coalition to co-produce
and sell services. They face the challenging task of distributing the revenue
from these services among themselves. Their bargaining power is essential
when negotiating the revenue share. Porter (1985) states the following about
coalition partners (author’s translation):
Coalition partners are and stay independent firms, and it be-
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comes a question of how the profits from the coalition should be
distributed. The relationship between the bargaining powers of
the coalition partners is therefore vital to how the extra profit is
shared, and through this it decides the effect of the coalition on
the firms’ competitive advantage.
The main focus of this thesis is the distribution of revenue, and not on the
competitive advantage of the coalition. Although Porter’s framework is of-
ten used to assess the attractiveness of industries, it can also be applied to
evaluate the bargaining and supplier power within coalitions such as those
brought about by service platforms with multiple business actors. The bar-
gaining dimension, as illustrated in Figure 3.2, is especially important.
Bargaining Power
Bargaining power is the power that buyers have to drive down prices of
the goods they are buying, and the power that suppliers have to drive up
prices of the goods they are supplying. Before discussing the consequences of
bargaining power to service platform cooperations, it is necessary to identify
the drivers of buyer and supplier power. Porter (1980) claims that a supplier
group is powerful if the following apply
• It is dominated by a few companies and is more concentrated than the
industry it sells to
• It is not obliged to contend with other substitute products for sale to
the industry
• The industry is not an important customer of the supplier group
• The suppliers’ product is an important input to the buyer’s business
• The supplier group’s products are differentiated or it has built up
switching costs
• The supplier group poses a credible threat of forward integration
He also states that a buyer group is powerful if the following circumstances
hold true
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• It is concentrated or purchases large volumes relative to seller sales
• The product it purchases from the industry represents a significant
fraction of the buyer’s costs or purchases
• The products it purchases from the industry are standard or undiffer-
entiated
• It faces few switching costs
• It earns low profits
• Buyers pose a credible threat of backward integration
• The industry’s product is unimportant to the quality of the buyer’s
products or services
• The buyer has full information
If a firm considers its buyers as the market, there is a very close relationship
between the terms bargaining power and market power. The determinants
of these are also closely linked. This is important to the discussion specific
to the Service Portfolio, because the bargaining power of the business actors
is being considered, and not their market power in the end user market.
3.1.3 Measuring Bargaining Power
One of the purposes of this thesis is to account for the effects of bargaining
power in the quantitative model developed. The bargaining power of business
actors affects the revenue share, and hence the profit of each business actor
from participating in the project. Consequently, one of the main issues that
needs to be resolved is how to measure and quantify this bargaining power.
Two measurement issues arise:
• How can the bargaining power of the business actors be measured?
• How can the impact of different factors on the bargaining power of
business actors be measured?
These measurement issues are very similar to the ones faced by economists
and regulatory authorities when attempting to measure the market power
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of firms (Church & Ware 2000). Two methods have been used extensively
for these types of measurements; Structure-Conduct-Performance (SCP), and
the New Empirical Industrial Organization (NEIO). SCP relies on accounting
data regarding profits and costs to measure market power. NEIO, which is a
more recent approach, uses comparative statistics to simultaneously estimate
both market power and marginal costs (Church & Ware 2000).
The model in this thesis uses the SCP approach to measuring market power
to measure and quantify the bargaining power of the business actors in the
Service Portfolio. This section first presents the SCP method before justi-
fying the choice of the method. The argument for using SCP continues in
Section 3.1.4, where it is argued that the structural variables of the SCP
equation are suitable for the Service Portfolio business situation.
Structure-Conduct-Performance
The SCP approach assumes that there is a stable relationship between the
structure of an industry, the firm conduct, and the market performance
(Church & Ware 2000). Since the relationship is assumed to be stable, the
two easily observed variables are normally used; structure and performance.
The structural variables used in SCP measurements have often been seller
concentration and barriers to entry.
Church & Ware (2000) list two underlying assumptions of the SCP model
that are repeated here:
1. SCP studies assume a stable relationship and a line of causality that
runs from structure through conduct to performance. If a stable rela-
tionship is established between structural variables and market power,
then the SCP implication is that this structural variable facilitates the
exercise of market power. Furthermore, it must be the case that the
structural variables are exogenous. Thus, they cannot be determined
by the same factors that determine market power. For inter-industry
studies, it must also be the case that the implied degree of symmetry
in conduct holds across industries.
2. The SCP studies start from the premise that measures of market power
can be calculated from available data. Accounting data can be used to
construct approximations to the Lerner index or economic profits.
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This thesis returns to these assumptions in the next section, and shows that
they hold for the business situation in the Service Portfolio.
Returning to the specific SCP method, a typical SCP study involves estimat-
ing the following equation or a close variant:
pii = α+ β1CONi + β2BE
1
i + β3BE
2
i + · · ·+ βN+1BENi
In the above equation, pii is some measure market power for firm i, such as
the Lerner index. CONi is a measure of concentration, and BE
j
i are indi-
cators of barriers to entry. The SCP hypothesis is that the market power is
determined by these factors, and hence that the β-values will be positive and
statistically different from zero. The β-values are determined through econo-
metric techniques, and measure the effect on market power from a marginal
change in each of the structural variables.
There are several methods for quantifying the concentration in an industry.
The most common are the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), and the four-
or eight-firm concentration ratios (CR4 or CR8). This thesis uses the HHI,
which is simply the sum of the squares of market shares for all firms in the
industry:
HHI =
N∑
i=1
s2i
As can be seen from the equation, HHI varies from 0 for perfect competition,
to 1 for monopoly. If there are N firms with equal market shares, then
HHI = 1
N
.
The SCP studies traditionally use one of three measurements of market
power; economic profits or rates of return on investment, Lerner index or
the price/cost-margin, or Tobin’s q. Tobin’s q uses stock market variations
to assess economic profits (Church & Ware 2000). This thesis uses the Lerner
index, which has been presented previously. Normally, accounting data for
marginal cost is not available, and an approximation such as the price/cost-
margin has to be used for SCP studies. However, this thesis assumes perfect
information, and hence the availability of marginal cost information. This
facilitates the use of the Lerner index as a measurement of bargaining power.
Note again that SCP studies most commonly are used for inter-industry mar-
ket power studies, but that this thesis uses the method to measure the market
power within the Service Portfolio. In other words, it measures the bargain-
ing power in the bargaining dimension of Porter’s five forces, as illustrated
in Figure 3.2.
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Arguments for SCP
As noted previously, this thesis uses the SCP method for quantifying bar-
gaining power between the business actors cooperating to produce the Service
Portfolio. When considering the providers of service enablers as suppliers,
and the Service Provider as the buyer, there is an internal market within the
Service Portfolio cooperation. Hence, the SCP method traditionally used to
measure market power can be used to measure the internal bargaining power.
Consequently, the SCP method is used for a study internal to the industry,
not an inter-industry study.
One of the main assumptions of the SCP studies is that there must be a
stable relationship between structure and performance. This thesis shows
that this assumption is aligned with applying bargaining power theory to
the Service Portfolio in the next section. Another assumption is that the
structural variables are exogenous. This is true for the variables presented in
the SCP equation. Furthermore, the assumption that the implied symmetry
must hold across industries is not relevant to this study as it is a study
internal to the Service Portfolio.
Another main assumption of SCP studies is that market power can be cal-
culated from available data. The availability of data is normally limited in
SCP studies. However, the quantitative model developed assumes perfect
information regarding marginal costs and prices, and hence this assumption
holds for the SCP measurement conducted herein.
3.1.4 Bargaining Power in Service Portfolios
To be able to use the SCP method for measuring bargaining power, it must
be the case that the structural variables in the SCP equation are truly the
determinants of bargaining power in the Service Portfolio. This section shows
that this assumption is consistent with the theory previously presented on
bargaining power.
Business Situation in the Service Portfolio
Before proceeding to the necessary arguments, a brief discussion of the busi-
ness situation in the Service Portfolio is required. This situation was ex-
plained in brief in Chapter 2, and is discussed specifically for each scenario in
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Chapter 4. The main property of the situation is that there is one business
actor of each type, except for the Content Provider. There can be numerous
Content Providers, and these can be part of the service platform or they can
be outside the platform. Hence, it is important to consider the bargaining
power of the Content Providers. In all business situations considered, the
Service Provider conducts the service composition by requesting the neces-
sary service enablers from the other business actors. This is described in
Chapter 2. Thus, the Service Provider can be regarded as the buyer and the
Content Providers as the suppliers.
Furthermore, this thesis assumes that the decision regarding vertical integra-
tion already has been made. This means that there is no threat of forward
or backward integration, as the business actors have already decided on their
capabilities and which service enablers they will provide. The term forward
integration means that suppliers of a product integrate the capabilities of
their buyers into their business, while backward integration means that buy-
ers integrate the capabilities of their suppliers into their business.
The decision to defer from forward or backward integration is normally made
with one or both of the following justifications. Firstly, it could be the case
that the total savings of vertical separation for the decision maker are greater
than the premium it has to pay for the increased bargaining power of sup-
pliers. Secondly, there may be regulatory or contractual terms that prohibit
such integration. The last justification is especially prominent in the telecom-
munications industry. Business actors here often have regulatory restriction
on what parts of the value chain they can do business in. For service plat-
forms, a sound assumption is also that the participating business actors have
decided on the responsibilities of each actor before entering the platform.
Thus, the assumption that the decision regarding vertical integration has
already been made is sound.
Another assumption of the model is that the decision regarding participation
in the service platform has been made. This means that no new business
actors can join the service platform throughout the period which the quanti-
tative model considers. Furthermore, the participants of the service platform
cannot buy service enablers from actors outside the service platform as long
as a business actor within the service platform can provide the same ser-
vice enabler. This increases the attractiveness of participating in the service
platform cooperation for the business actors.
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Determinants of Bargaining Power in Service Platforms
Section 3.1.2 presented the determinants of market and bargaining power
as listed by Porter (1980). This section goes through the relevant determi-
nants for the Service Portfolio presented in Chapter 2. The determinants
previously listed are presented in Table 3.1 and Table 3.2. These tables also
include a brief comment on the situation in the Service Portfolio. Recall that
the Service Provider is considered the buyer and the Content Providers are
considered suppliers.
The tables show that only some of the claims change depending on the busi-
ness situation. These are the ones concerning the concentration of the Con-
tent Providers, the switching cost that has been built up, and the differenti-
ation of the products (service enablers) bought/supplied.
Claims S.1 and S.2 lead to the conclusion that bargaining power of the Con-
tent Providers increases with an increase in the concentration of Content
Providers. This is consistent with the SCP equation. The value of the
CON -variable increases with an increase in concentration, thereby leading
to a larger Lerner index for the Content Providers.
Claims S.5, B.3 and B.4 lead to the conclusion that the bargaining power of
Content Providers increase with an increase in the degree of differentiation
of their products, and with their buildup of switching costs. The Content
Providers can build up the switching costs of the Service Providers by partic-
ipating in the service platform cooperation. By doing this, they assure that
the Service Provider cannot buy service enablers they possess from outside
the platform. Moreover, the Content Providers have differentiated products
if they are the only provider of a Content Provision service enabler. This is
strongly correlated with two factors; the concentration of Content Providers,
and whether or not they are part of the service platform. From this discus-
sion, it is concluded that the SCP equation should include a BE1-variable
accounting for whether or not the Content Providers are part of the service
platform. Furthermore, as the degree of differentiation is correlated with
the concentration of Content Providers, this supports the use of the CON -
variable in the equation.
The equation used for the quantification of bargaining power will from the
above arguments be as follows:
Lj = β1CONj + β2BE
1
j
Where Lj is the Lerner index for Content Providers in scenario j, CONj is
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(#) Claim TRUE/FALSE Comment
(S.1) Supplier group is
dominated by a few com-
panies and is more concen-
trated than the industry it
sells to.
TRUE/FALSE Depends on the concentra-
tion of Content Providers.
(S.2) Supplier group is not
obliged to contend with
other substitute products
for sale to the industry.
TRUE/FALSE Depends on the concentra-
tion of Content Providers
and whether they are part
of the service platform or
not.
(S.3) The industry is not
an important customer of
the supplier group.
FALSE The Service Provider is the
industry in this claim. The
statement is false because
the Service Provider is an
important customer of the
Content Providers.
(S.4) The suppliers’ prod-
uct is an important input
to the buyer’s business.
TRUE The Content Providers’
service enablers are neces-
sary to produce the ser-
vices.
(S.5) The supplier group’s
products are differentiated
or it has built up switching
costs.
TRUE/FALSE The supplier groups’ prod-
ucts can be differentiated if
a Content Provider is the
only provider of a Content
Provision service enabler.
The Content Providers can
also build up switching
(barriers to entry) costs
through participating in
the service platform.
(S.6) The supplier group
poses a credible threat of
forward integration.
FALSE They do not pose such
a threat. It is assumed
that the decision regarding
vertical integration already
has been made.
Table 3.1: Supplier (Content Provider) bargaining power. The more TRUE claims,
the greater the bargaining power of suppliers.
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(#) Claim TRUE/FALSE Comment
(B.1) Buyer group it is
concentrated or purchases
large volumes relative to
seller sales.
TRUE Buyer group is concen-
trated as it only consists
of one firm, the SP. If the
platform is significant to
the supplier, the relative
volumes will also be large.
(B.2) The product it pur-
chases from the industry
represent a significant frac-
tion of the buyer’s costs or
purchases.
TRUE For the Service Provider,
the cost of service en-
ablers represents a signifi-
cant portion of the service
cost.
(B.3) The products it pur-
chases from the industry
are standard or undifferen-
tiated.
TRUE/FALSE The products (service en-
ablers) can be undiffer-
entiated if there are a
large number of Content
Providers providing the
same Content Provision
service enablers, especially
if the Content Providers
are outside the service
platform cooperation.
(B.4) It faces few switching
costs.
TRUE/FALSE If the Content Providers
are part of the service plat-
form, the claim is true.
Otherwise, it is false.
(B.5) It earns low profits. TRUE/FALSE Depends on the situation.
(B.6) Buyers pose a credi-
ble threat of backward in-
tegration.
FALSE They do not pose such
a threat. It is assumed
that the decision regarding
vertical integration already
has been made.
(B.7) The industry’s prod-
uct is unimportant to the
quality of the buyer’s prod-
ucts or services.
FALSE The quality of the sup-
pliers product is impor-
tant, but this considera-
tion should already have
been made when entering
into service platform coop-
eration.
(B.8) The buyer has full in-
formation.
TRUE It is assumed that this
is true within the service
platform.
Table 3.2: Buyer (Service Provider) bargaining power. The more TRUE claims,
the greater the bargaining power of buyers.
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the HHI concentration measurement for Content Providers in scenario j, and
BE1j is a boolean variable indicating the Content Providers’ participation in
the service platform in scenario j. Figure 3.3 shows an example of a price
calculation from the SCP equation. This example is for a case with two
content providers, both participating in the service platform. The price of
SE3 from BA5 is calculated. The example demonstrates that it is possible to
calculate the prices of the Content Provision service enablers when knowing
the owners’ marginal costs.
CON1 = 0.5, BE
1
1 = 1, CostSE5,3 = 0.6
β1 = 0.3, β2 = 0.2
L1 = β1CON1 + β2BE
1
1
P5,3 =
CostSE5,3
1− β1CON1 + β2BE11
P5,3 = 0.92
Figure 3.3: Example of SCP equation.
The discussion in this chapter shows that the level of profitability will be
higher for Content Providers participating in the service platform. Partic-
ipation in the service platform is a strategic decision, and such strategic
decisions to build up barriers to entry often come at a cost. With the service
platform in this thesis, it is assumed that the participating business actors
will have to contribute to the platform research and development. This will
bring with it a higher investment cost for the participants. This is accounted
for in the scenarios presented in Chapter 4.
This section has shown that the variables of the SCP equation are consistent
with the theory of bargaining power when applying this to the service plat-
form considered. To effectively apply the SCP equation, the β-coefficients
need to be determined.
Coefficients of SCP equation
A large amount of research has been conducted on the link between structural
characteristics and market power. Church & Ware (2000) present a table of
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Lerner estimates for selected industries. Taylor & Zona (1997) estimate the
Lerner index for AT&T in the long-distance telephone markets. Bresna-
han (1989) conducts an empirical study of industries with market power. All
these authors find that some firms in selected industries have significant mar-
ket power and Lerner indices ranging from 0 to 0.89. The direct link between
structure and performance is, however, a disputed area among economists
(Church & Ware 2000). Nonetheless, this thesis claims that the link is rel-
evant internal to service platforms. To be able to use the SCP equation in
the CF model, a value of the β-coefficients must be set. As noted previously,
these coefficients together with two structural variables give a value of the
Lerner index for the Content Providers.
To effectively employ the SCP estimate of bargaining power in the CF model,
the effects of concentration and service platform participation on price mark
up must be empirically estimated. This requires data on firm price mark ups,
and the exercise itself is out of scope of this thesis. However, estimates of
the β-coefficients are provided in the CF model.
3.1.5 Product Life Cycle Theory
Figure 3.4: Product Life Cycle (PLC) curve
After launching a new product or service, it is the goal of the firm for the
product to enjoy a long and prosperous life. Management knows that the
product will have a life cycle, but the exact shape and length of it is difficult
to predict. Figure 3.4 shows an example of a Product Life Cycle (PLC).
Not all products follow this cycle. Some are introduced and die quickly, while
others stay in the market for a very long time (Kotler & Armstrong 2004).
Because of rapid technological innovation, communication and IT services
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tend to have a relatively short life span. This thesis valuates the services
in the Service Portfolio from their introduction to the point where they are
phased out. Since the services have already been developed, the product
development phase is not included in the CF model. The development costs
however, can be accounted for by adding investment costs to the costs of the
business actors.
The goal of the business actors participating in the Service Portfolio is to
maximize their net present value (NPV) of the cash flow from the services.
The business actors can determine the prices of the services to influence
the product life cycle. The price influences the shape of the PLC curve
significantly. By choosing different prices and pricing schemes, the PLC
curve takes on different forms.
Figure 3.5: Cash flow scenarios
Figure 3.5 shows different cash flow scenarios for a particular business actor.
Clearly, curve (a) represents the optimal cash flow. However, it is important
to keep the objective of the business actors in mind. This objective is to
optimize their NPV, not to seek some certain shape of the PLC curve. Hence,
the maximization of their NPV is the objective, and PLC curves like the
ones shaped in Figure 3.5 are often the result of this objective. They are not
objectives themselves.
3.1.6 Pricing Schemes and Strategies
The price of an IT and communication service can be composed of both a
variable and a fixed part.
price = f + v
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In the above equation, f is a fixed price for the use of services independent of
the number of service instances used. This can be seen as a subscription fee
for the use of services. v is a variable price that depends on the number of
service instances used. One of these can be zero, leading to a variety of pricing
schemes. Different pricing schemes are often introduced to suit different
consumer types. The purpose of this is to transfer as much of the potential
consumer surplus to the producer as possible, from as many consumer types
as possible. Pricing schemes can also be adapted to suit different consumer
segments better than the pricing schemes of the competitors (Schotter 2001).
Pricing is a highly strategic decision. A wide variety of strategies can be
employed, and Kotler & Armstrong (2004) discuss some of these. The Service
Provider will in the situations evaluated in this model set the price of a new
service introduced in the market. Hence, the“new product”pricing strategies
discussed in (Kotler & Armstrong 2004) are the most relevant to this model.
The two are presented below, with descriptions based on the descriptions of
Kotler and Armstrong:
• Market-Skimming Pricing. Products can be launched with initially
high prices to skim revenues layer by layer from the market. Market
skimming makes sense only under certain conditions. First, the qual-
ity and image must be able to support the higher price, and enough
buyers must want the product at that price. Furthermore, the costs
of producing a smaller volume cannot be so high that they cancel the
advantage of charging more.
• Market-Penetration Pricing. Another approach to new product pricing
is market-penetration pricing. This approach involves setting a low
initial price in order to penetrate the market quickly and deeply. High
sales volumes may lead to lower production costs through economies
of scale and scope. Like market-skimming pricing, market-penetration
pricing only makes sense under certain conditions. First, it must be
the case that the market is highly price sensitive so that a low price
produces a larger market growth. Second, total production costs should
decline as volume increases.
When considering communication and IT services, it is often the case that
the marginal costs are low, while the upfront investment costs are high. This
means that the average cost per service is significantly higher when producing
small volumes. Moreover, experience has shown that the consumers of IT
an communication services are highly price sensitive (Shy 2001). Many IT
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and communication products are also the subject of network externalities.
Network externalities make the users of a service better off the larger the
number of total users of the service. A large initial adoption of a service
would fuel such network externality effects. All of the above factors speak
for the market-penetration pricing as the most suitable pricing scheme for
the Service Portfolio. This is also the pricing scheme that is modeled in the
CF model.
3.1.7 Competition
This chapter has previously discussed the bargaining dimension of Porter’s
strategic evaluation framework. The other important dimension is the com-
petitive dimension. Porter (1980) notes that “competition in an industry
continually works to drive down the rate of return on invested capital toward
the competitive floor rate of return”. This is also the case for the IT and
communication industry considered in this thesis.
The competition in the market is a very important aspect influencing the
demand of services from the Service Portfolio. The pace of innovation is
rapid in the IT and communication industry, and the type of competition is
divided into two categories based on this:
• Competition with the same kind of technology
• Competition with a new and disruptive technology
Competition with the same kind of technology is the competition faced by
the Service Portfolio from industry competitors, substitutes and potential
entrants all with the same technological platform as the Service Portfolio is
based on. For instance, this could be competitors with the same kind of
network and positioning technology.
Sometimes a new and disruptive technology is introduced to the competitive
arena. A disruptive technology is a technological innovation that eventually
overturns the existing technology in the market (Christensen 2003). An ex-
ample of this is digital photography taking over for traditional film-based
photography, or semiconductors replacing vacuum tubes in computers. More
specifically for the business actors in the Service Portfolio, they might face a
competitor in the future with a superior technology. How they react to such
competition greatly influences the value of the services they are selling.
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The CF model of this thesis accounts for the competition through the use
of different market scenarios. This is the same way as Langøygard (2006)
handles competition in his CF model.
3.1.8 User Acceptance
One key factor of the valuation in the CF model is user acceptance. User
acceptance deals with how the services of the Service Portfolio will be ac-
cepted in the market to which they are sold. Predicting how these services
will be accepted throughout the time span of the Service Portfolio is a com-
plex task, but this section will try to investigate the main determinants of
user acceptance.
The possible influencing factors are believed to be
• network externalities
• how much the consumers use the services
• how well off the consumers are when using the services
Shy (2001) states that “consumers preferences are said to exhibit network
externalities if the utility of each consumer increases with an increase in the
total number of consumers purchasing the same compatible brand”. This is
often the case for traditional telecommunication services. It is, however, less
clear if the concept of network externalities applies in the same degree to the
services of the Service Portfolio. The services of this portfolio are content
provisioning services, where content often is requested from the provider of
the services. If this is the case, network externalities are not likely to exist
as the consumer is indifferent to the number of consumers purchasing the
services. Some of the services of the Service Portfolio involve content sharing
between users. It is likely that such a sharing is more valuable if there are a
larger number of users of the services. Hence, these services may be subject
to network externalities. The service diffusion model presented later in this
chapter accounts for some degree of network externalities. The CF model
assumes that this is appropriate for the services in the Service Portfolio, and
that the network externalities do not have to be modeled when considering
user acceptance.
The model of Langøygard (2006) is based on the model of Golebiowski,
Langøygard & Tindlund (2005). In the latter model, a rather complex proce-
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dure was developed to calculate how usage of a service in one period induced
demand for correlated services in the next period. The reasoning behind this
effect seems to be reasonable, but the implementation is problematic because
it requires the estimation of correlation in demand between the different ser-
vices. Therefore it was not implemented in Langøygard’s model, nor will it
be implemented in the model of this thesis.
The last of the previously listed influencing factors on demand is “how well
off the consumers are when using the services”. How well off consumers
are is often measured by the consumer surplus. The consumer surplus is a
monetary measure of the benefit a consumer receives from consuming a good
at a certain price (Schotter 2001).
Figure 3.6: Consumer surplus
As noted previously, this thesis will use the demand curve to determine the
demand of individual consumers. Such a demand curve can be used to explain
the concept of consumer surplus. Consider Figure 3.6, which illustrates the
demand for a service for one individual consumer. With the current price 1.0,
the consumer purchases six service instances. For the first service instance,
the consumer would have been willing to pay 1.5. With a fixed price of 1.0
however, the consumer pays this price for all service instances. The area of
the triangle defined by M, P and the intersection of P and the demand curve
constitutes the consumer surplus when the number of instances purchased
is continuous. The number of services in this situation is discrete, and the
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consumer surplus is defined by the area of the bars in Figure 3.6.This area
is 0.5 + 0.4 + 0.3 + 0.2 + 0.1 = 1.5, and represents the consumer surplus for
this given consumer.
The consumer surplus described above is not used directly in the model.
Instead, it is approximated by the price to max price ratio (P/M ratio). This
measure is used as a quantification of user acceptance. The user acceptance
is in turn used to determine the demand growth from one period to the next.
The higher the level of user acceptance in one period, the larger the increase
in demand to the next period will be. The P/M ratio measures nearly the
same as the consumer surplus; the P/M ratio measures how well off the
consumer is when buying the first service instance. Hence the P/M ratio is
positively correlated with the consumer surplus.
3.1.9 Capital Budgeting and Net Present Value
Bierman Jr. & Smidt (1993) state the following about capital budgeting
decisions
A capital budgeting decision is characterized by costs and benefits
that are spread out over several time periods. This leads to a
requirement that the time value of money be considered in order
to evaluate the alternatives correctly.
The CF model accounts for the time value of money through discounting
the cash flow (costs and benefits) with the appropriate discount factor. This
gives the net present value (NPV) of the Service Portfolio for each business
actor. An incremental cash flow is an item that changes the bank account
balance or cash balance, in this case; revenue, costs and taxes. Financial
types of cash flows are not included in the investment analysis (Bierman Jr.
& Smidt 1993).
If it is assumed that capital can be borrowed and lent at the same rate of
interest, all projects with a positive NPV should be accepted. However, this
is not an assumption that will fit the situation of the business actors in the
Service Portfolio. The capital available for investments is often limited, and
the business actors will have to choose a portfolio of projects that maximize
their returns (Bierman Jr. & Smidt 1993).
In Langøygard’s (2006) model, a possible is outcome is that some business
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actors obtain a negative NPV from the valuation, while the total NPV for
the Service Portfolio is positive. From the above discussion, this outcome
will most likely lead to the business actors with negative NPVs rejecting the
project. It might also be the case that some business actors require a NPV
above a certain threshold, in this thesis called the net present value threshold.
The net present value threshold might also be set by the optimizer (the
business actor optimizing its NPV) based on strategic considerations. For
instance, it might be the case the Service Provider wishes to keep the NPV of
the Network Provider above NOK 20 mill for the sake of future cooperation.
Such situations are discussed in the scenario descriptions of Chapter 4.
The CF model in this thesis implements new functionality to cope with net
present value thresholds. Such thresholds can be set for each business ac-
tor, and the model will attempt to redistribute revenue to satisfy these con-
straints. This functionality is discussed further in the description of the CF
model in Chapter 5.
3.2 Regulation and Service Diffusion
Regulation and public policy have traditionally been important to the com-
munication and IT industry. This section discusses what regulatory issues
that need to be considered by the CF model. Another important area left to
discuss is service diffusion; how can the population be expected to adopt the
services? A service diffusion model that describes the diffusion of services in
a population is presented in this section.
3.2.1 Regulation
The telecommunications industry has traditionally been heavily regulated.
Some consequences of this regulation have been described in Chapter 2.
Regulatory decisions have had a great impact on the development of the
telecommunications industry. Even though the regulation has been softened,
it is still one of the most heavily regulated industries around (Dodd 2005,
Gruber 2005).
The history of regulation is not important to the CF model, but the current
regulatory scheme is. There are several regulatory authorities, in Norway
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the Norwegian Post and Telecommunications Authority (NPT) is the most
important. The regulation regime is complex, and it is not the intention
of this thesis to explore all the effects of regulation on telecommunication
services. Nonetheless, a brief discussion of regulation for the specific Service
Portfolio is necessary.
The Service Portfolio considered in this thesis is a content provisioning port-
folio. This means that the portfolio provides a variety of different content
to the users. It is important to note that there probably are few barriers
to entry for other business actors and service platforms to deliver the same
kind of services. Consequently, the chances of market failure are reduced
(Shy 2001). Overall, this thesis assumes that the market mechanisms func-
tion well for content provisioning services. Nonetheless, it is likely that some
restrictions on the minimum price of the services will be imposed. The CF
model accounts for this through setting a price floor based on the costs of
producing services that the prices cannot drop below.
3.2.2 Service Diffusion Model
Service diffusion is the adoption of a new service or product in a popula-
tion. Gruber (2005) discusses service diffusion for a range of products, with
an emphasis on mobile telecommunication services. He states that tech-
nological innovations, such as mobile telecommunications, are typically not
immediately adopted by all potential customers. The“epidemic”approach to
diffusion models has proved to be particularly popular. This approach mod-
els diffusion similar to the way that diseases spread in biology, the number
of new adopters is related to the stock of current adopters (Gruber 2005).
This closely related to the concept of network externalities that is commonly
observed with telecommunication services (Shy 2001).
This thesis will use the most common of the logistic diffusion functions to
model the service diffusion. This class of diffusion functions are called S-
shaped or sigmoid. The function is as follows
yt =
y∗
1 + e−(a+bt)
In the above equation, yt is the number of adopters at time t. The number
of potential adopters is y∗. If a function of the above kind is plotted, it will
look like the plot of Figure 3.7.
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Figure 3.7: Shape of the sigmoid diffusion curve.
The derivative of the sigmoid function reveals more of its properties
dyt
dt
= byt
(
1− yt
y∗
)
Rearranging yields
dyt
dt
1
yt
= b
(
y∗ − yt
y∗
)
As seen from the above equation, the parameter b indicates the diffusion
speed. It equals the growth rate in the number of adopters at time t, relative
to the fraction of adopters that have not yet adopted at time t. The sigmoid
curve has the property of having a second derivative that changes from pos-
itive to negative at y∗/2. In other words, the growth rate is at its largest
when half of the population have adopted the services (Gruber 2005). The
parameter a of the sigmoid function shifts the curve backwards (larger a) or
forwards (smaller a). It does not change the shape of the curve otherwise,
and can be considered a timing variable.
The sigmoid function is used to estimate the number of adopters at a given
time, knowing the number of potential adopters. The number of potential
adopters for the mobile services in this thesis can be seen as a proportion of
the population in the area where the services are being offered.
y∗t = γtPOPt
In the above equation, POPt is the total population at time t in the area
where the services are being offered. γt is the share of this population using
mobile services.
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Chapter 4
Scenarios
This chapter introduces the scenarios that are used as input to the quantita-
tive model developed. The scenarios are used to conduct a proof-of-concept
test on the CF model. The proof-of-concept test is carried through to test
the quality of the model and the feasibility of its outcome. To conduct this
test proper input data is required. The scenarios presented in this chapter
provide this.
4.1 Introduction
The scenarios described in this chapter provide necessary scenario-specific
input to the CF model. One of the main goals of the CF model is to account
for the effect of bargaining power on the revenue share agreement between
the business actors. The bargaining power of the business actors depends on
the business situation and the business actor strategies. Another of the main
goals of the CF model is to redistribute the revenue to arrive at an outcome
acceptable to all business actors. To account for different situations and
actors with differing strategies, scenarios are needed to represent different
sets of input.
One of the research questions posed in the problem formulation of this thesis
is ”How can scenarios be used to represent business models and business
strategies?”. This chapter tries to answer this question through developing
scenarios describing these characteristics and justifying the approach chosen.
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Chapter 3 discussed how the structural characteristics of the business situa-
tion and the service platform affect the bargaining power of the participating
business actors, and specifically the content providers. Hence, the scenarios
have to contain variables describing these aspects. The scenarios should also
contain variables that test the redistribution of revenue.
4.2 Scenario Modeling
This thesis uses three specific scenarios describing different inputs for the CF
model. These scenarios are named after the market form when considering
the Content Providers; monopoly, oligopoly and free market. They differ in
the number of Content Providers offering the necessary Content Provision
service enablers, and in the business model and strategy of these Content
Providers.
The scenarios are described in three steps. First, a textual explanation of the
scenario is given to describe the general situation. Following this, the service
composition is described with UML Use Cases. The service composition is
important to the bargaining power because it describes how the services are
created through the interaction between the business actors. It also illustrates
how the Service Provider has to choose between the Content Providers if there
are two or more the latter.
The service composition is described technically for two purposes. Firstly,
the technical specification describes how the services are created through
combining service enablers. This provides a better understanding of how the
service platform functions. Secondly, the technical specification illustrates
how the business actors interact. This is important to the understanding of
bargaining power, and hence to the revenue share.
The last part of each scenario description is the definition of input variables
to the CF model. These variables are derived from the textual and technical
description of the scenarios, and provide the formal input to the CF model.
4.2.1 Scenario Variables
The following variables are defined for each scenario
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Scenario Variables
wmn the values of the w-matrix
Investm,t the investment costs incurred by BAm in time period t
Costm,t the overhead costs incurred by BAm in time period t
CostSEmn the cost incurred by BAm for one usage of SEn
CON the concentration of content providers
BEm indicating built up barriers to entry by BAm
npvTm NPV threshold for BAm
The w-matrix is the matrix that assigns service enabler ownership to busi-
ness actors. The entries in the matrix are binary variables that take on the
following values:
wmn =
{
1 if BAm owns SEn
0 otherwise
The CON -variable measures concentration in the scenarios. The importance
of concentration to Content Providers in content provisioning portfolios is
discussed in Chapter 3. The chosen measurement is the Herfindahl-Hirshman
Index (HHI), and the value of the CON -variable is the value of HHI for the
specific scenario.
The BEm is a binary variable that takes on the following values:
BEm =
{
1 if BAm participates in the service platform
0 otherwise
This variable is only defined for the Content Providers, as it is an input to
the SCP equation only used to calculate the bargaining power of content
providers. As discussed in Chapter 3, a business actor can create barriers
to entry by participating in the service platform. The decision of whether
or not to participate in the service platform is one of significant strategic
importance.
From the SCP equation discussed in Chapter 3 it can be seen that partic-
ipation in the service platform increases the bargaining power of the Con-
tent Providers. This increase in bargaining power leads to a larger value of
the Lerner index, and hence a higher level of profitability for the Content
Providers. However, this thesis assumes that participation in the service
platform to increase bargaining power also has a cost. This cost is accounted
for through the Investm,t-variable, which will have a larger value for service
platform participants than for the business actors that do not participate.
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In addition to the investment costs related to service platform participation,
each business actor is assumed to have research and development costs related
to their service enablers. This is accounted for through assuming that each
business actor will have to pay one unit of research and development person-
nel for each service enabler they own that is in use. This cost is included in
the Investm,t-variable.
Furthermore, each business actor will have overhead costs related to the
production of services. These costs are constant, and do not depend on the
number of service instances delivered. The costs depend on the number of
personnel that each business actor employs. It is assumed that the Service
Provider and the Network Provider require two units of personnel for the
production of services, and that the remaining business actors require one
unit of personnel. The Service Provider will probably need personnel for
customer care, and the Network Provider will probably need personnel for
network maintenance. Hence, these two business actors are modeled with
one more unit of personnel than the other business actors. Overhead costs
are accounted for in the Costm,t-variable.
The model of this thesis assumes that the number of personnel needed for
overhead work and research and development is constant, and does not de-
pend on the number of service instances produced. This assumption is made
based on the fact that the production of communication and IT services are
characterized by significant economies of scale (Dodd 2005).
In addition to the above variables, all scenarios contain a NPV threshold for
all business actors except for the Content Providers, npvTm. This variable
sets a lower limit on the acceptable NPV of the project for the respective
business actors. As discussed in Chapter 3, this limit could be a result of
strategic considerations. For instance, the Service Provider could wish to set
a limit higher than zero to please certain other business actors.
The scenario variables above are not included in the model of Langøygard
(2006), as his model accounts for neither differing business situations nor
bargaining power.
4.2.2 Scenario Market Variables
The scenarios also contain the following variables describing the market per-
formance and business environment
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Scenario Market Variables
dPt annual growth in price P
i
t
at shifts the sigmoid adoption curve horizontally
MaxAdoptiont max annual growth in demand
DemandLosst annual loss of demand to competition
The CF model will use three different market scenarios to account for the
market development, one pessimistic, one realistic, and one optimistic. The
market scenarios will have different values for the above listed variables.
For instance, the DemandLosst variable will be larger for the pessimistic
scenario, accounting for a larger loss of demand to competition.
These market scenarios will be paired with each of the scenarios describing the
business situation, such that there will be three market scenarios for each of
the business scenarios. For example, there will be a pessimistic, a realistic and
an optimistic market scenario for the monopoly business situation. Hence,
there will be nine different sets of input to the CF model.
The scenario market variables are mostly the same as in the scenarios of
Langøygard (2006). No probabilities are attached to the market scenarios.
The use of market scenarios accounts for risk through illustrating different
market development.
4.3 Market Scenarios
The variables of the three market scenarios are shown in Figure 4.1. The
market scenarios have different values for all their variables. They are named
after the market development seen from the Service Portfolio’s perspective;
pessimistic, realistic and optimistic.
All scenarios have different values for the at-variable shifting the sigmoid
diffusion function forwards or backwards. A lower value of at, such as for the
pessimistic scenario, will shift the sigmoid function forwards. This represents
a pessimistic situation where the diffusion starts at a later time than with
a higher value of at. This is described further in the phase descriptions of
Chapter 5.
The MaxAdoptiont-variable sets an upper limit on the increase of demand
from one period to the next. This upper limit varies from market scenario
to market scenario, with the largest value for the optimistic scenario and the
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Figure 4.1: Variables of the three market scenarios.
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smallest for the pessimistic scenario.
The pessimistic market scenario represents a situation where the Service
Portfolio faces competition from a disruptive technology from the fourth year
of operation. The disruptive technology offers superior services at a lower
price, and the Service Portfolio has a significant demand loss from the fourth
year and onwards. To counter the disruptive technology, the Service Portfolio
also reduces the prices of the services significantly.
The realistic market scenario represents a situation where the services of the
Service Portfolio are adopted on a relatively large scale in the population.
The price is decreased slightly throughout the years of operation to retain
customers. The demand loss is minor in the first years of operation, but
increases towards the end of the time period considered. The increase is due
to the ageing services of the Service Portfolio.
The optimistic market scenario represents a situation where the services of
the Service Portfolio become very popular, and there is little competition.
The price decrease starts later than for the realistic market scenario because
there is less competition. The loss of demand is also smaller due to the lower
level of competition.
4.4 Scenario 1: Monopoly
• One Content Provider
• Content Provider participates in the service platform
• Content Provider delivers all three Content Provision service enablers
• NPV threshold of 0 for BA 1-4
4.4.1 Description
This scenario represents a business situation where the Content Provider has
monopoly on the Content Provision service enablers. In other words, there is
only one Content Provider, and it delivers all three of the Content Provision
service enablers. Furthermore, the Content Provider is part of the service
platform.
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As discussed in Chapter 3, the Service Provider cannot purchase the Con-
tent Provision service enablers from any business actors outside the service
platform when there is a Content Provider participating in the platform co-
operation. This means that the Content Provider in this scenario has built
up barriers to entry through contractual terms. It is in effect the only choice
for the Service Provider.
Both the low concentration of Content Providers (there is only one), and the
barrier to entry increase the bargaining power of the Content Provider. The
SCP equation will reflect this through a high value of the Lerner index, as
explained in Chapter 3
In this scenario the NPV threshold of business actors 1-4 is set to 0. This
means that these business actors will accept the project if their NPV from
the Service Portfolio is larger than 0. Recall that no NPV threshold is set
for the Content Providers.
4.4.2 Service Composition
Figure 4.2 shows a UML Use Case diagram of the service composition in
the Monopoly scenario. Note that there is only one Content Provider, and
that this Content Provider participates in the service platform. The figure is
somewhat simplified as it only shows one Content Provision service enabler.
4.4.3 Variables
Monopoly Scenario Variables
CON = 1
BE5 = 1
The remaining variables are found in Figure 4.3.
4.5 Scenario 2: Oligopoly
• Three Content Providers
• Content Providers participate in the service platform
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Figure 4.2: Use Case diagram showing service composition in the monopoly sce-
nario.
• Every Content Provider delivers all three Content Provision service
enablers
• NPV threshold of 0 for BA 1, 3 and 4. 70 million for BA2.
4.5.1 Description
This scenario represents a business situation where the internal market for
Content Provision service enablers can be considered an oligopoly. Oligopoly
is a situation where there is a high concentration of producers - competition
among the few (Church & Ware 2000). In this scenario there are three Con-
tent Providers, with every one of them offering all three Content Provision
service enablers. The Content Providers are all part of the service platform
cooperation.
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Figure 4.3: Variables of Scenario 1: Monopoly.
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Like in the Monopoly scenario, the Service Provider is limited to purchas-
ing the Content Provision service enablers from the three aforementioned
Content Providers in this scenario, as they are part of the service platform.
Also like in the Monopoly scenario, and for the same reason, these Content
Providers have built up barriers to entry.
Compared with the Monopoly scenario, the concentration in this scenario is
lower due to the increased number of Content Providers.
In this scenario the NPV threshold of business actors 1, 3 and 4 is set to 0.
This means that these business actors will accept the project if their NPV
from the Service Portfolio is larger than 0. For the Context Provider (BA2),
the NPV threshold is set to 70 million, which means that this business actor
will only accept the project with a NPV larger than 70 mill. Recall that no
NPV threshold is set for the Content Providers.
4.5.2 Service Composition
Figure 4.4 shows a UML Use Case diagram of the service composition in
the Oligopoly scenario. Note that there are three Content Providers, all
participating in the service platform. Note also that the Service Provider
now has to choose between the three providers. The CF model makes this
choice based on the prices of the Content Provision service enabler prices, as
explained in Chapter 5.
4.5.3 Variables
Oligopoly Scenario Variables
CON = 1
3
BEm = 1, m ∈ [5, 7]
The remaining variables are found in Figure 4.5.
4.6 Scenario 3: Free Market
• Ten Content Providers
• Content Providers do not participate in the service platform
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Figure 4.4: Use Case diagram showing service composition in the oligopoly sce-
nario.
• Content Providers deliver different Content Provision service enablers
• NPV threshold of 0 for BA 1-4
4.6.1 Description
This scenario represents a business situation with close to perfect competi-
tion. In this scenario, there are ten Content Providers. None of them par-
ticipate in the service platform cooperation. All of them compete to deliver
the Content Provision service enablers to the service composition.
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Figure 4.5: Variables of Scenario 2: Oligopoly.
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Unlike in the previous two scenarios, these Content Providers are not part
of the service platform. Hence, they have not built up any barriers to entry.
They are free to offer their service enablers to Service Providers in multiple
service platforms.
The concentration ratio in this scenario is lower than in the two previous
scenarios due to the increase in number of Content Providers. This, together
with the lack of participation in the service platform, will result in a lower
value of the Lerner index from the SCP equation.
The Content Providers in this scenario have chosen an increased degree of
liberty over increased bargaining power. They are free to offer their service
enablers to a large number of business actors, but have a lower degree of
bargaining power due to the lack of participation in the service platform.
In this scenario the NPV threshold of business actors 1-4 is set to 0. This
means that these business actors will accept the project if their NPV from
the Service Portfolio is larger than 0. Recall that no NPV threshold is set
for the Content Providers.
4.6.2 Service Composition
Figure 4.6 shows a UML Use Case diagram of the service composition in
the Free Market scenario. Note that there are ten Content Providers, and
that none of them participate in the service platform. As with the Oligopoly
scenario, the Service Provider has to choose between the Content Providers
available. Also like in the Oligopoly scenario, the Service Provider chooses
the Content Providers from their service enabler prices. In this scenario
however, the Service Provider is free to “shop around”, as it is not limited
contractually to a small number of Content Providers participating in the
service platform.
4.6.3 Variables
Free Market Scenario Variables
CON = 1
10
BEm = 1, m ∈ [5, 14]
The remaining variables are found in Figure 4.7.
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Figure 4.6: Use Case diagram showing service composition in the free market
scenario.
4.7 Scenario Summary
Table 4.1 contains a summary of the three different scenarios describing the
market situation. A brief comment on their differences and similarities is
also included.
Recall that each of these scenarios are paired with all three market scenarios;
the pessimistic, the realistic, and the optimistic. This gives a total of 3×3 = 9
input sets to the CF model.
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Figure 4.7: Variables of Scenario 3: Free Market.
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Chapter 5
Cash Flow Maximization Model
Before making investment decisions regarding participation in or the launch
of a service portfolio, it is important to valuate the service portfolio quanti-
tatively. Significant factors that influence the valuation are aspects such as
user behavior and acceptance, competition, business strategies, the system
model and the technology. All these aspects, and more, are accounted for in
the model developed.
This chapter presents the cash flow maximization model (CF model) that
this thesis has sought to develop. First, a brief introduction to the model
and the work it is built on is given. Next, a brief introduction to the model
phases are presented before each phase is discussed in detail.
The CF model is developed to be as generic as possible. It is created using
Microsoft Excel work sheets and uses phases to be easy to follow. Although
the model is tested with input from the PATS service platform, this input can
be changed as the users of the model wish to value other service portfolios.
Furthermore, the model is created such that only the input variables need to
be changed when valuing other service portfolios, the transformations in the
interior of the model will still work and conduct a quantitative valuation.
5.1 Introduction
The model in this thesis is based upon the models of Langøygard (2006) and
Zoric & Lassen (2005). Their models provide a quantitative framework for
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the valuation of telecommunication services. Langøygard’s model consists of
eleven phases, all of which are used in some form in the CF model of this
thesis. The differences between the model of this thesis and the model of
Langøygard are discussed for each of the phases.
Because the CF model developed here contains a large number of variables
and transformations of these, it is divided into separate phases. The purpose
of each of these phases is to receive certain variables as input, perform a
limited set of transformations on these, and pass the result on to the next
phases as output variables from this phase. This approach has several ad-
vantages. One advantage is that it makes it easier to account for market
mechanisms separately, such as having a separate phase for the calculation
of demand. It also facilitates the addition or removal of such mechanisms.
Another advantage of the phases-based approach is that it makes it easier to
identify errors throughout the development of the model by isolating these
errors to specific phases.
A third and very important advantage of the phases-based approach is that
it makes it easier to extend the model to account for new aspects. Through
adding new phases, and slightly modifying existing ones, this thesis accounts
for important new aspects in the valuation of IT and communication service
portfolios.
The model in this thesis accounts for two main new aspects in the model
• Bargaining power effects on revenue share
• Redistribution of revenue to reach a solution acceptable to all business
actors
The original model of Langøygard (2006) set a fixed per-unit price for the
service enablers delivered by the business actors to the service composition.
The service provider collected the revenue from the users and paid the co-
producing business actors according to this pre-determined price. One prob-
lem with this solution is that it does not directly account for the bargaining
power of the business actors. Another problem is that it does not align the
incentives of the service provider and the other business actors. The other
business actors will want to maximize the number of service instances sold,
since they are paid on a per-unit basis and not a percentage of the collected
revenue. Hence, they are not interested in the total revenue from the project,
and will set the price to a minimum to maximize their revenue if they are
able to determine the final prices of services.
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This thesis extends the model to account for bargaining power and through
this compute the revenue share among the business actors. This is done
through the specification of the business situation and business actor strate-
gies in scenarios, and using this as input to new phases in the model. The
scenarios were described in Chapter 4. This thesis also tries to align the in-
centives of as many business actors as possible through modifying the revenue
share agreement.
Another improvement area is the final distribution of revenue. In Langøy-
gard’s model, a possible outcome is that the total NPV of the service portfolio
is positive, while the NPV for certain business actors is negative. This im-
plies that the service portfolio project cannot be launched because some of
the business actors do not find it profitable to participate. Furthermore, the
Service Provider might wish to keep the NPV outcome of certain business
actors above a certain threshold, as discussed in Chapter 3. A redistribu-
tion of the revenue in such a situation could bring the NPVs of all business
actors within the acceptable regions. The model presented in this chapter
handles this by adding a new phase that redistributes the revenue after the
optimization. This functionality could be run in several iterations in search
of a feasible solution.
One significant difference from Langøygard’s model is that the CF model
of this thesis only has one pricing scheme. During testing with Langøy-
gard’s model, implemented in Microsoft Excel, it has been concluded that
the Solver1 cannot find the optimal solution to a model with two pricing
schemes. Rather than to support to schemes and get poor results, this model
uses one pricing scheme to increase the quality of the results.
5.1.1 Time Span
The product life cycle for telecommunication services varies greatly from
service type to service type, and the shape and form of this curve has been
discussed in Chapter 3. This thesis uses a life time for the services of ten
years. This is thought to be a realistic life time for the content provisioning
services of the Service Portfolio. Like the other variables, this should be
changed according to the service portfolio being valuated.
1Microsoft Excel’s built in optimization tool.
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5.1.2 Notation
This section presents the general notation used in the CF model. The indices
and the general notation are listed below.
Indices
t time period, with Service Portfolio: t = 0 . . . 9
i number of service, with Service Portfolio: i = 1 . . . 7
m number of business actor, with Service Portfolio:
m = 1 . . .
n number of service enabler, with Service Portfolio:
n = 1 . . . 9
General Notation
Si service number i
BAm business actor number m
SEn service enabler number n
With matrices and vectors, the dimensions are included in the variable name.
For instance, the w-matrix presented in Chapter 4 is denoted wmn. This is
an m by n matrix, with rows representing business actors (m) and columns
representing service enablers (n). When referring to a specific element of this
matrix, say the third element on the fourth row, this is written wmn[4, 3].
Furthermore, matrix multiplication is denoted by ×. Ordinary multiplication
is denoted by · or no sign at all. Note that · does not represent the scalar
product of two vectors.
5.1.3 Service Portfolio
The Service Portfolio was described in Chapter 2. Although the CF model
is designed to be generic and adaptable to different service portfolio inputs,
this thesis uses the Service Portfolio to test the functionality of the model.
Regardless of what input is used, specifying the service composition matrix
and the ownership of service enablers is important. This section presents the
symbols and matrices that are used to describe the Service Portfolio.
The service composition matrix illustrates which service enablers that are
necessary to produce the different services. This matrix is presented in Ta-
ble 5.1. The table is the same as in Chapter 2, but is repeated here to
emphasize the importance of specifying the service composition.
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Si SE1 SE2 SE3 SE4 SE5 SE6 SE7 SE8 SE9
S1 x x x x x x
S2 x x x x x x
S3 x x x x x x x
S4 x x x x x
S5 x x x x
S6 x x x x
S7 x x x x x x
Table 5.1: Service composition matrix represented as a table.
BusinessActorID Business Actor Abbreviation
BA1 Service Provider SP
BA2 Context Provider CtxtP
BA3 Network Provider NP
BA4 Identity Provider IdP
BA5→ Content Provider CP
Table 5.2: Business actors in Service Portfolio.
Another important piece of input is the matrix that specifies the service
enabler ownership. As noted in Chapter 3, service enablers SE1 to SE6 are
owned by one business actor each. SE7, SE8, and SE9 are owned by Content
Providers. There may be one or more Content Providers owning an instance
of each service enabler, and a Content Provider may own one, two or all of
these service enablers. This was specified in Chapter 4, and hence the exact
matrix varies from scenario to scenario. Table 5.2 presents an overview of
the business actors participating in the production of services. Table 5.3
illustrates which service enablers each of these business actors own. Note
again that there may be more than one Content Provider, and that these
are numbered from BA5 and upwards, represented by the business actor IDs
BA5→.
5.1.4 Scenario Input
The input that is scenario-specific, and thus varies from scenario to scenario,
is described in the scenarios presented in Chapter 4. To valuate different
business situations and account for this in the revenue share, three different
scenarios are used. These differ in the market form and business strategy for
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ServiceEnablerID Service Enabler Name Responsible BA
SE1 Network BA3 - NP
SE2 Context BA2 - CtxtP
SE3 Service Composition BA1 - SP
SE4 QoS BA3 - NP
SE5 A4C BA1 - SP
SE6 Identity Management BA4 - IdP
SE7 Content Provision (Context-Based) BA5→ - CP
SE8 Content Provision (Sharing) BA5→ - CP
SE9 Content Provision (Information) BA5→ - CP
Table 5.3: Service enabler ownership in Service Portfolio.
the Content Providers. Furthermore, each of these scenarios is coupled with
the market scenarios. There are three different market scenarios; one pes-
simistic, one realistic, and one optimistic. Combined, this gives nine different
sets of input.
5.1.5 Phases Overview
As noted previously, the model is divided into different phases representing
different market mechanisms and calculations. The phases take input from
other phases, perform transformations on this input, and pass the processed
variables on as output. Each phase represents a work sheet of the Excel
model. The model consists of 14 phases, three more than the model of
Langøygard (2006). The three new phases have been introduced to account
for two new aspects; the bargaining power effects on the revenue share (phases
3 and 4), and the redistribution of revenue to reach a solution acceptable to
all business actors (phases 4 and Post-1). A simple black box illustration of
the CF model is provided in Figure 5.1. A summary of the functionality of
each phase is given in Table 5.4 and Table 5.5. The phases are described in
detail in the remainder of this chapter.
The black box illustration in Figure 5.1 provides an overview of the model
and its functionality. A black box model like this shows the main input
and output of each phase, but does not describe the internal transformations
in each phase. These transformations are described in later sections. The
rounded rectangles in the illustration represent phases of the model, while
the rectangles with pointed edges represent some of the main variables. Some
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Figure 5.1: Black box illustration of CF model. The rounded rectangles represent
phases of the model, and the rectangles with pointed corners represent some of
the main variables. The illustration is a simplification; the model itself contains
significantly more variables than the ones shown in this illustration.
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Phase Summary
Phase 1: General Vari-
ables
Contains general input common to all scenarios.
Phase 2: Scenario
Variables
Contains scenario specific input.
Phase 3: Bargaining
Power
Calculates the bargaining power of the Content
Providers, and chooses a Content Provider for
each of the Content Provision SEs.
Phase 4: Revenue
Share
Calculates the revenue share matrix from general
and bargaining power input.
Phase 5: Demand Calculates the autonomous demand; the demand
given that the services are free. This value pro-
vides an extreme point for the demand curve.
Phase 6: Users Calculates the number of users of each service
during the life time of the Service Portfolio.
Phase 7: Pricing The price variable is used to optimize the NPV
of the BAs, subject to certain constraints. There
is one pricing scheme, with a variable per-usage
price.
Phase 8: Use Calculates the average use of each user. This
use is normally distributed, and a function of
the demand from Phase 5 and the price.
Phase 9: User Accep-
tance and Competition
The demand in the next phase is assumed to in-
crease with an increase of the consumer surplus
in the current phase (user acceptance). Compe-
tition is accounted for through a scenario vari-
able setting the loss of demand to competition.
Phase 10: Aggregate
Volumes
Combines the values of the previous phases to
arrive at aggregate service volumes.
Phase 11: Revenues Calculates the revenue for each business actor.
Phase 12: Costs Calculates the costs for each business actor.
Phase 13: Net Present
Value
Accounts for revenues, costs and financial pa-
rameters to arrive at the net present value of the
Service Platform for each business actor.
Table 5.4: Overview of the phases of the CF model
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Phase Summary
Phase Post-1: Redis-
tribution
Checks if the result is acceptable to all business
actors (npvm ≥ npvTm). Redistributes the rev-
enue through modifying the revenue share ma-
trix if this is not the case, and halts the search
if no feasible solution is found.
Table 5.5: Overview of the post-phases of the CF model
of the variables are shown in the illustration to make it more intuitive, while
other more detailed variables have been left out to simplify the illustration.
The illustration is divided into two main parts, one for the phases that deal
with market mechanisms, and another for the phases that deal with financial
calculations. The phases have been numbered from 1 to 13, but because the
flow of data is not linear the flow of the model does not exactly follow this
numbering. It should also be noted that the scenario and general variables
phases provide input to more phases than shown in the illustration. When
examining the black box illustration, the phase descriptions of Table 5.4 and
Table 5.5 could be used for additional information regarding the behavior of
the model.
5.2 Phase Descriptions
This section provides a detailed description of each phase of the CF model.
The description of each phase consists of a general description, a list of input
and output variables, a mathematical description of transformations, and
comments on the calculations of the phase. The CF model consists of 14
phases.
As noted previously, the CF model of this thesis adds three phases to the
model of Langøygard (2006). These are:
• Phase 3: Bargaining Power
• Phase 4: Revenue Share
• Phase Post-1: Redistribute
Some of the phases that are adopted from Langøygard’s model have received
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minor modifications. As most of the adopted phases are similar to the ones
used in Langøygard’s model, their descriptions in this thesis is also similar.
5.2.1 Phase 1: General Variables
This phase specifies all the variables that are common to all scenarios. There
are no variable transformations in this phase, and all the variables in this
phase act as input to other phases.
The general description of the service portfolio and its services is presented
in this phase. The service portfolio used in this valuation is the one that was
presented in Chapter 2. This Service Portfolio is presented in a way that
can be used as input to the valuation in the other phases. More specifically,
the general variables phase contains a service composition matrix, describing
what service enablers that are necessary to compose the different services.
The user base for each service is also common to all scenarios, and these
numbers are presented in this phase. Variables describing the price/demand
dynamics are contained in this phase. Furthermore, variables describing fi-
nancial rates such as the discount and amortization rates are defined here.
The general variables, except the matrices presented earlier in this chapter,
are presented in Figure B.1 in Appendix B. The general variables for demand
and max price are the same as in Langøygard (2006), as the same services
are being modeled.
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Variables
General Variables
zin values of the service composition matrix
µi0 mean value of demand for service i in year 0
λi relation between mean demand and standard devi-
ation
POP0 population in the area where the services are offered
at t = 0
dPOP population growth rate
γt share of the population that uses mobile services
bt variable deciding the speed of the user growth
dMt annual growth in max price
M i0 year 0 max price for service i
r discount rate
d depreciation rate
τ tax rate
β1 CON-coefficient of the SCP equation
β2 BE-coefficient of the SCP equation
The z-matrix is the service composition matrix. The entries in the matrix
are binary variables that take one the following values:
zin =
{
1 if SEn is used by Si
0 otherwise
Comments
This phase contains the variables that have the same value for all scenarios.
The variables are the same as those of Langøygard, less some that have to
be transferred to Phase 2 due to the new scenario situation. The w-matrix,
the fixed costs, and the investments have been moved to Phase 2.
5.2.2 Phase 2: Scenario Variables
This phase resembles the general variables phase in the way that it contains
variables that act as input to the other phases, and conducts no variable
transformations. The variables in this phase, however, are specific to each of
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the scenarios. This implies that the input variables that change from scenario
to scenario need to be defined in this phase.
Each scenario specified in Chapter 4 contains a set of input variables to the
CF model. The business actors vary from scenario to scenario, and are hence
specified in this phase. Service enabler ownership is scenario specific and
defined here. The calculations of bargaining power in later phases are based
on variables from this phase.
As explained in Chapter 4, there are two types of scenarios; business situation
scenarios and market scenarios. There are three of each kind. The business
situation scenarios are:
• Scenario 1: Monopoly
• Scenario 2: Oligopoly
• Scenario 3: Free Market
In addition to these, there are three market scenarios, containing scenario
market variables:
• Pessimistic Scenario
• Realistic Scenario
• Optimistic Scenario
The scenarios above are coupled, giving a total of nine different sets of input
to the valuation. For instance, the Monopoly scenario will be run with all
three market scenarios. The business situation scenarios contain the variables
that determine the effects of bargaining power. The market scenarios account
for risk through describing different market development.
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Variables
Scenario Variables
wmn values of the w-matrix
Investm,t investment costs incurred by BAm in time period t
Costm,t overhead costs incurred by BAm in time period t
CostSEmn cost incurred by BAm for one usage of ESn
CON concentration of content providers
BEm indicating built up barriers to entry by BAm
npvTm NPV threshold for BAm
Scenario Market Variables
dPt annual growth in price
at shifts the sigmoid adoption curve horizontally
MaxGrowtht max annual growth in demand
DemandLosst annual loss of demand to competition
Comments
This section contains the scenario-specific variables. These variables describe
the business situation and the market development. The scenarios are dis-
cussed in detail in Chapter 4.
5.2.3 Phase 3: Bargaining Power
This phase determines the bargaining power of the business actors partici-
pating in the Service Portfolio. More specifically, it quantifies the bargaining
power of the Content Providers. This quantification is conducted by applying
the theory of Chapter 3 to the scenarios described in Chapter 4. Also, this
phase makes the choice between Content Providers based on their service
enabler prices, if there is more than one Content Provider providing a cer-
tain Content Provision service enabler. The price of each Content Provision
service enabler is calculated from the marginal cost and bargaining power of
the Content Provider owning this enabler.
Through determining the bargaining power of the business actors the CF
model accounts for this new aspect, not included in Langøygard’s (2006)
model. Accounting for bargaining power is one of the main contributions of
this CF model.
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Variables
Input Variables
CON concentration of content providers (Phase 2)
BEm existence of barriers to entry (Phase 2)
β1 CON-coefficient of the SCP equation (Phase 1)
β2 BE-coefficient of the SCP equation (Phase 1)
CostSEmn cost incurred by the owning BAm for one usage of
SEn (Phase 2)
zin service composition matrix (Phase 1)
wmn values of the w-matrix (Phase 2)
Output Variables
PriceCPSEmn price paid to BAm (CPs) for one usage of SEn
w˜mn revised w-matrix
C˜ostSEmn revised SE cost matrix
Transformation Functions
Pmn − CostSEmn
Pmn
= β1CON + β2BEm (5.1)
Pmn =
CostSEmn
1− β1CON − β2BEm (5.2)
5.1 is the SCP equation presented in Chapter 3, with the Lerner index as the
measure of profitability. Rearranging yields 5.2 and the price of the service
enabler. These calculations are conducted for all Content Providers and their
service enablers.
The Content Provider with the lowest price for each of the three Content
Provision service enablers is chosen to deliver that service enabler to the ser-
vice production. These prices are combined in a new matrix, PriceCPSEmn,
as shown in equation 5.3.
PriceCPSEmn =
{
Pmn if Pmn ≤ Pjn, ∀j ∈ m
0 otherwise
(5.3)
When knowing which Content Provider that will provide each of the service
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enablers, a revised w-matrix can be created. This matrix has an entry in
[m,n] if business actor BAm provides the service enabler SEn to the service
composition. This is shown in equation 5.4.
w˜mn =
{
1 if BAm provides SEn to the service composition
0 otherwise
(5.4)
For the revenue share agreement in Phase 4, it is important to know the
costs involved with producing each service. The CostSEmn-matrix needs
to be adjusted to only account for the business actors participating in the
service production. That is, if a business actor has a cost related to a service
enabler that is not being used in the composition of a service, this cost should
not be included in the cost-matrix. The revision of the matrix is shown in
equation 5.5.
C˜ostSEmn[i, j] = w˜mn[i, j] · CostSEmn[i, j], ∀i, j (5.5)
Note that the above matrix now only contains cost entries for service enablers
that are being used in the service composition.
Comments
This section calculates the service enabler price charged by the Content
Providers as a result of their bargaining power and marginal costs. This
price is calculated from the SCP equation, using the CON and BEm vari-
ables and the β-coefficients. The values of β1 and β2 are set to 0.3. These
values reflect relevant research examined in Chapter 3. When the CF frame-
work developed in this thesis is used for other service portfolios than the
one examined in this thesis, the β-values should reflect the industry experi-
ence of the firm using the framework. One possibility is to use econometric
techniques on previous data and prices of service enablers.
This section also determines which business actors that participate in the
service composition. For SEs 1-6 the choice is simple, as there is only one
provider of each service enabler. For the Content Provision service enablers
however, a choice might have to be made. Based on these choices, the w-
and CostSEmn-matrices are revised.
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5.2.4 Phase 4: Revenue Share
This phase determines the revenue share between the business actors co-
producing the services. All revenue is collected by the Service Provider, and
then distributed to the other business actors according to the revenue share
agreement. The purpose of this phase is to calculate the specific revenue
share, giving all business actors offering service enablers in the composition
of a service a share of the revenue.
The Revenue Share phase accounts for the bargaining power calculated in
the Bargaining Power phase.
Figure 5.2: The Service Provider collects the payments from the users. The Con-
tent Providers receive a fixed price per service enabler instance, while the other
business actors receive a percentage of the revenue.
All business actors except for the Content Provider receive a percentage of the
revenue. The Content Providers receive a price per service enabler instance.
This is illustrated in Figure 5.2. The price was calculated in Phase 3.
This phase is run for the first time during the first iteration. If the Re-
distribute phase determines that the revenue share should be revised, the
revenue share matrix in this phase is adjusted. See the Post-1 Redistribute
phase description for further details on this matter.
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Variables
Input Variables
PriceCPSEmn price paid by the SP to CP for one usage of SEn
(Phase 3)
zin service composition matrix (Phase 1)
C˜ostSEmn the cost incurred by the owning BA for one usage
of SEn (Phase 3)
Output Variables
rmi revenue share matrix
CostPerServicemi cost incurred by BAm for one delivery of service i
Transformation Functions
Phase 3 calculated the price that each Content Provider charges for a service
enabler, and chose the Content Provider charging the lowest price. This
phase maps this payment from service enablers to services. It calculates the
price charged for each service instance by the Content Providers as shown
in the equation below. This price decides how much of the revenue that is
transferred to the specific Content Providers. The mapping of prices from
service enablers to services is shown in Equation 5.6.
CPPricemi = PriceCPSEmn × zTin (5.6)
For all business actors other than the Content Providers, the marginal cost
of producing one service instance is what determines their revenue share.
When distributing the revenue, the Service Provider first pays the Content
Providers their required price. Following this, the remaining business actors
receive a percentage of the revenue determined by the ratio of their marginal
cost for delivering a service to the total marginal cost of delivering this service.
This percentage is calculated in equation 5.7 and 5.8.
CostPerServicemi = C˜ostSEmn × zTin (5.7)
CostPercentagemi =
CostPerServicemi∑4
j=1CostPerServicemj
(5.8)
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The above calculations are necessary to arrive at the output of this phase,
the revenue share matrix. This matrix consists of two main parts. The first
four rows of the matrix, representing the first four business actors, show the
percentage of the revenue that these receive. The remaining rows show the
price that the CPs charge per service instance delivered. The deduction of
the matrix is shown in equation 5.9.
rmi =
{
CostPercentagemi if m ≤ 4
CPPricemi otherwise
(5.9)
Comments
This phase calculates the revenue share matrix. All business actors, except for
the Content Providers, get a percentage of the total revenue. This percentage
is determined by the participating business actors’ share of the total marginal
production costs.
The entries in the matrix for the Content Providers specify the price that
the chosen Content Provider charges for one instance of a specific service.
For the other business actors, the matrix contains the share that these will
receive of the remaining revenue.
To summarize; Phase 3 determines the prices of the Content Provision service
enablers based on the marginal costs and bargaining power of the Content
Providers. Phase 3 also selects the cheapest Content Provider(s) for the ser-
vice composition. Based on this input and the marginal costs of the remaining
business actors, Phase 4 calculates the revenue share matrix.
5.2.5 Phase 5: Demand
This phase calculates the autonomous demand; the demand for each service
by each consumer assuming that the services are free. The CF model assumes
that this demand is normally distributed. The benefit of calculating the
autonomous demand before accounting for pricing and market effects is that
it is possible to isolate these effects.
This phase takes input from the User Acceptance and Competition phase to
account for growth in autonomous demand from consumer surplus and loss
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of demand to competition.
The autonomous demand calculated in this phase provides an extreme point
for the demand curve, the maximum quantity of a service users would con-
sume given that the service is free. The autonomous demand is an important
input to Phase 8, where price is taken into account.
Variables
Input Variables
NetDemandGrowthit annual growth of service demand (Phase 9)
µi0 mean value of demand for service i in year 0
(Phase 1)
λi relation between demand mean and standard devi-
ation for service i (Phase 1)
Output Variables
Qit demand for service i in year t
µit expected value of Q
i
t
σit standard deviation of Q
i
t
Transformation Functions
The Qit variable is normally distributed, with µ
i
t as mean and σ
i
t as standard
deviation.
Qit ∼ N(µit, (σit)2) (5.10)
The mean of this distribution is affected by the input from Phase 9, account-
ing for user acceptance and competition. Note that NetDemandGrowth will
be negative if there is a net loss of demand.
µit+1 = µ
i
t(1 +NetDemandGrowth
i
t+1) (5.11)
The standard deviation is specified in Phase 1 as the relation between de-
mand mean and standard deviation. This relations is assumed to stay con-
stant throughout the lifetime of the Service Portfolio, such that the standard
deviation is always given as
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σit = λ
iµit (5.12)
Comments
The calculations of this phase are quite straight forward. The transformation
function accounts for the annual growth in demand and calculates the mean
demand and its standard deviation for each service throughout the time span
of the Service Portfolio.
5.2.6 Phase 6: Users
Figure 5.3: The shape of the sigmoid curve for the scenario values of a.
This phase calculates the number of users for the services offered throughout
the years of operation. Gruber (2005) shows that the sigmoid logistic diffu-
sion function has been a good measure of the number of users for previous
telecommunication services. The sigmoid curve for the scenario values of at
is shown in Figure 5.3. The diffusion process is described in Chapter 3.
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Variables
Input Variables
POP0 total population in year 0 (Phase 1)
dPOP population growth rate (Phase 1)
γt share of the population using mobile services
(Phase 1)
bt variable deciding the speed of the user growth
(Phase 1)
at shifts the sigmoid adoption curve horizontally
(Phase 2)
Output Variables
usersit the number of users of service i at time t
users∗t total number of potential users at time t
Transformation Functions
POPt+1 = POPt(1 + dPOP ) (5.13)
users∗t = γtPOPt (5.14)
usersit =
users∗t
1 + e(−at−btt)
(5.15)
Comments
The user base is the same for all the services of the Service Portfolio. The
user adoption is determined by the sigmoid function. at is a scenario variable
shifting the sigmoid function backwards or forwards. bt decides the diffusion
speed, and is the same for all scenarios. In this model, bt = 1.3 ,∀t.
The variable POP0 and dPOP are set to 100000 and 0%, respectively. The
POP0 variable should be set according to the population in the area where
the services are available. 100000 is regarded as a sound estimate for the
Service Portfolio, it is also the value used by Langøygard (2006). The dPOP
variable is set to 0% as numbers from Statistics Norway show a population
increase of less than one tenth of a per cent over the last years ((SSB) 2007).
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The variable γt indicates the share of the population using mobile services.
Statistics from the Norwegian Post and Telecommunication Authority show
that there were 5040573 mobile subscribers in Norway in 2006 ((NPT) 2007).
At the same time, numbers from Statistics Norway indicate a population of
4660677 ((SSB) 2007), which gives a value of 1.08 for γt. The thesis assumes
that the penetration stays the same throughout the considered time span of
the CF model.
5.2.7 Phase 7: Pricing
The price is the variable subject of optimization in the CF model. The price is
set to maximize the NPV for the business actor performing the optimization.
The business actor sets the price for the first year for each service within some
constraints described below. The price in the following years is determined
by variables from Phase 1 and Phase 2, determining the growth in prices.
This phase determines the prices for services in the years following the first,
and the constraints that the price has to lie within.
Variables
Input Variables
M i0 max price for service i in year 0 (Phase 1)
’ dMt annual growth in max price (Phase 1)
dPt annual growth in price (Phase 2)
Output Variables
M it max price for service i in year t
P it price of service i in year t
Transformation Functions
P it+1 = P
i
t (1 + dPt) (5.16)
M it+1 =M
i
t (1 + dMt) (5.17)
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Pmini =
∑
∀m
(
C˜ostSEmn × zTin
)
[m, i]
=
∑
∀m
CostPerServicemi[m, i]
(5.18)
maxnpvBAm
s.t. Pmini ≤ P it
(5.19)
Comments
Equation 5.16 calculates the price in the years following the first from the
input variables describing the price growth.
The max price variable, M it , determines the maximum price of services. This
max price is needed for determining the demand in other phases. The trans-
formation is shown in equation 5.17.
The CF model accounts for regulation through determining a minimum price
that the Service Provider can charge for each service. The steps for calculat-
ing this minimum price is shown in equation 5.18. The minimum price for
a service is set to the total marginal costs of producing this service. This
implies that the regulatory authorities do not allow pricing below marginal
costs.
The minimum price acts as a condition for the optimization problem, as
shown in equation 5.19. The optimization problem maximizes the NPV sub-
ject to this condition, by changing the prices of the services.
This phase has one significant change from the corresponding phase of Langøy-
gard’s (2006) model. In this CF model, there is only one pricing scheme, as
opposed to Langøygard’s two. This simplifies the model, and has the ad-
vantage of making the optimization solvable by the Micosoft Excel Solver
add-in.
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5.2.8 Phase 8: Use
This section accounts for the pricing effects on demand. The price/demand
relationship is constructed by the two extreme points on the curve; the max
price calculated in Phase 7, and the autonomous demand calculated in Phase
5. By combining the price and the demand curve, the demand for each service
by each user is calculated. This demand is called use, and hence this is the
name of the phase. The demand of each user is assumed to be linear, and
inversely proportional to the service price.
Variables
Input Variables
P it price of service i in year t (Phase 7)
M it max price of service i in year t (Phase 7)
Qit demand for service i in year t (Phase 5)
µit expected value of Q
i
t (Phase 5)
σit standard deviation of Q
i
t (Phase 5)
Output Variables
U it average use
Transformation Functions
Each user has a downwards sloping linear demand curve, where the normal
distribution for use gives one of the extreme points. This extreme point is
the autonomous demand, the demand given that the services are free. The
maximum price constitutes the other extreme point. Hence, the use of a
certain user can be found through the following equation
U(Q,P it ,M
i
t ) = Q
(
1− P
i
t
M it
)
(5.20)
In the above equation P it is the price for service i at time t, and M
i
t is the
corresponding max price. These are the same for all users. The Q-variable is
the autonomous demand, for this specific user and this specific service. This
variable is drawn from the normal distribution Qit ∼ N(µit, (σit)2).
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Because there is a large number of users of the services, the randomly drawn
variable Q can be approximated by the mean demand µit. Hence, equa-
tion 5.20 can be approximated by:
U it = U(µ
i
t, P
i
t ,M
i
t ) = µ
i
t
(
1− P
i
t
M it
)
(5.21)
Comments
Figure 5.4: Price/demand curve. Extreme points from max price (M) and mean
demand (µ).
Figure 5.4 illustrates the demand curve for the users of the services. Note
that this demand is the use per user, taking the price into account. Hence,
the U -value is the number of service instances requested by each user. This
value is a function of the price, the max price, and the average autonomous
demand from Phase 5.
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5.2.9 Phase 9: User Acceptance and Competition
This phase accounts for the effects of user acceptance and competition on
the demand. The model assumes that the increase in demand in the next
time period depends on how well off the users are off in the previous period.
The model also accounts for competition by including the effects of loss of
demand to competition.
Consumer surplus is a common measure of how well off the consumers are
(Schotter 2001). This thesis uses the price/max price ratio as an approxima-
tion of consumer satisfaction. The less the price/max price ratio, the better
off are the consumers. This was discussed in Chapter 3.
Competition is accounted for by including loss off demand to competition.
Variables
Input Variables
P it price of service i at time t (Phase 7)
M it max price of service i at time t (Phase 7)
MaxGrowtht max growth in demand from P/M ratio (Phase 2)
DemandLosst the net transfer of demand to competitors (Phase 2)
Output Variables
PMratioit ratio between variable price and max price
GrossDemandGrowthitgross annual growth of service demand
NetDemandGrowthit net annual growth of service demand
Transformation Functions
The price to max price ratio needs to be calculated as this ratio is important
to the demand growth
PMratioit =
P it
M it
(5.22)
The gross demand growth is given from the price to max price ratio, and the
net demand growth from the gross demand growth and the loss of demand
to competition.
GrossDemandGrowthit = 1− 1.5(PMratioit) (5.23)
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NetDemandGrowthit = GrossDemandGrowth
i
t −DemandLossit (5.24)
The variable MaxGrowtht limits the NetDemandGrowth
i
t variable. The
max growth in demand is determined by this market scenario variable.
Comments
The coefficient of 1.5 for the gross demand growth is the same as used by
Langøygard (2006). From the transformation functions, it can be seen that
the demand in the next time period is influenced by the price to max price
ratio of the current period. The higher this ratio is, the better off the con-
sumers, and the larger the increase in demand. This effect is explained in
Chapter 3.
The net demand growth accounts for the loss of demand to competitors.
This effect varies from market scenario to market scenario, and is specified in
Phase 2. The maximum growth in demand is limited by a scenario variable
specified in Phase 2; MaxGrowtht.
5.2.10 Phase 10: Aggregate Volumes
The aggregate demand for all services is calculated in this phase. The output
from the phases Use and Users provide the input for this phase. Transfor-
mations in this phase are simple multiplications of this input.
Variables
Input Variables
usersit the number of users of service i at time t (Phase 6)
U it average use (Phase 8)
Output Variables
volumeit total service volume
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Transformation Functions
By combining the average use of each user and the number of users, the total
volume of service instances sold is found
volumeit = U
i
t · usersit (5.25)
Comments
This phase calculates the aggregate volumes through simple multiplications.
The total volume is arrived at through combining the average use and the
number of users for each service in each time period.
The phase has the same functionality as the corresponding phase in Langøy-
gard’s model, except for this model only having one pricing scheme.
5.2.11 Phase 11: Revenue
The Revenue phase calculates revenue for all business actors based on the pre-
vious phases. The revenue is collected by the Service Provider and distributed
among the business actors participating in the co-production according to the
revenue share agreement.
Variables
Input Variables
volumeit total service volume (Phase 10)
rmi revenue share matrix (Phase 4)
Output Variables
revBAm,t revenue for BAm from time period t
Transformation Functions
The Content Providers are paid on a per-service-instance basis, and this
payment constitutes their revenue
revBAm,t = rmi × volumeit, m ≥ 5 (5.26)
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The other business actors receive a percentage of the remaining revenue
revBAm,t = rmi × remainingRevenueit, m ≤ 4 (5.27)
Comments
This section calculates the revenue per business actors from the prices, total
volumes, and the revenue share matrix. Recall that all business actors except
for the Content Providers are paid a percentage of the revenue. The Content
Providers receive a per-usage payment for their service enablers.
5.2.12 Phase 12: Costs
In this phase, the variable production costs for each business actor are cal-
culated. Variable costs are determined by the number of service instances
delivered of each service, and thereby the number of times the specific service
enablers are used in the production of services. Important input to this phase
is the aggregate demand for services and the marginal costs for delivering the
service enablers that these consist of. The service enabler costs have already
been combined to get the cost per service of each business actor in Phase 4,
the result was the matrix CostPerServicemi.
Variables
Input Variables
volumeit total service volume (Phase 10)
CostPerServicemi cost matrix (Phase 4)
Output Variables
costBAm,t variable costs for BAm in time period t
Transformation Functions
The cost of each business actor is found by combining the cost matrix from
Phase 4 and the total service volumes from Phase 10.
costBAm,t = CostPerServicemi × volumeit (5.28)
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Comments
This phase calculates the variable costs from the service production for each
BA. The variable costs are a multiplication of the service instances produced
and the costs for the service enablers required for each service.
5.2.13 Phase 13: Net Present Value
This phase combines the revenue and costs of the business actors to arrive at
the cash flow. The cash flow is discounted according to the discount factor
to get the net present value, and thereby the valuation of the project for each
business actor.
Variables
Input Variables
Investm,t investment costs incurred by BAm in time period t
(Phase 2)
Costm,t overhead costs incurred by BAm in time period t
(Phase 2)
costBAm,t variable costs for BAm from time period t
(Phase 12)
revBAm,t revenue for BAm from time period t (Phase 11)
r discount rate (Phase 1)
d depreciation rate (Phase 1)
τ tax rate (Phase 1)
Output Variables
npvBAm NPV for BAm from Service Portfolio
Transformation Functions
To arrive at the net present value of the Service Portfolio for each business
actor, financial statements are created. An income statement, a book value
of investments in assets, and a cash flow statement are constructed for each
business actor. The income statement and the book value of investments in
assets are necessary to account for taxes.
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The book value of investments shows the book value of the investments that
have been made. Investments include investments in the service platform for
the participants in this, and research and development (R&D) investments
through R&D personnel costs. It is necessary to keep track of the book value
of investments to calculate the appropriate tax expenses for each business
actor. The model in this thesis assumes that the tax depreciation rate is the
same as the book depreciation rate, and sets this to 25 percent.
The income statement calculates the gross profit, operating income, EBIT
(Earnings Before Interest and Taxes), and the net profit before and after
taxes.
The cash flow statement shows all events that affect the bank account balance
or cash balance of the business actor. This includes sales, COGS (Cost of
Goods Sold), operating expenses, investments, net taxes, and net tax benefit.
In case of a net tax benefit or negative net taxes, the model assumes that
the business actors have other operating income where this can be deducted.
The tax rate is set to 28 percent.
Comments
This phase calculates the net present value of the Service Portfolio for each
business actor through discounting the cash flow from the project. The cash
flow that is discounted is the net cash flow of the cash flow statement, and the
discounting rate is set to 15 percent. An example of the financial statement
this phase generates can be seen in Figure C.1 in Appendix C.
5.2.14 Phase Post-1: Redistribute
This phase is named Post-1 because it happens ex post the specific valuation
of the service portfolio. The phase is introduced in the model because the
revenue share might need to be revised to make the project acceptable to all
the participating business actors.
After an iteration of the model with the original revenue share agreement,
it might be that the NPV for certain business actors is below their NPV
threshold. This would imply that the project cannot be carried through
because one or more business actors refuse to participate because of the
financial outlook. However, it might be possible to revise the revenue share
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agreement within the limits of each business actor such that all business
actors end up with a NPV above their NPV threshold.
The purpose of this phase is hence to check if the NPV outcome is acceptable
for all business actors. If not, it investigates if the revenue share agreement
can be revised to reach an agreement that all business actors can accept.
This search is conducted through providing new input to the Revenue Share
phase. A possible outcome is that there is no solution that falls within the
business actors’ acceptable regions. The search for new solutions is then
halted.
Variables
Input Variables
npvBAm NPV for BAm from Service Portfolio (Phase 13)
npvTm NPV threshold for BAm (Phase 2)
rmi revenue share matrix (Phase 4)
Output Variables
rmi revised revenue share matrix (Phase 4)
Transformation Functions
This phase examines the NPVs calculated in Phase 13. The NPVs of the
Content Providers are not included in the examination, and are not subject
to revision. If the total NPV of all business actors is larger than the combined
values of the npvTm-values, an acceptable solution can be reached through
redistributing the revenue.
This phase works in several iterations. In each iteration, the business ac-
tors with an NPV-value less than their npvTm-value get their revenue share
percentage increased by one percent for each service they are involved in.
One iteration works as follows:
• If BAj has a NPV where npvBAj < npvTj, this phase increases this
business actor’s revenue share percentage by one percent for all services
where the business actor delivers service enablers.
• The business actors which already have a NPV where npvBAj ≥ npvTj
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get their revenue share percentage reduced for all services where there is
an increase to business actors with NPVs less than their threshold. The
reduction is one percent multiplied by this business actor’s share of the
production costs for this service. Hence, the reduction is proportional
to the given business actors percentage of the production cost for the
given service.
Comments
This phase has been introduced to arrive at a solution acceptable to all
business actors. It redistributes the revenue according to the principles of
the revenue share calculations of Phase 4. The functionality of this phase is
discussed further in the proof-of-concept tests in Chapter 6.
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Chapter 6
Results and Discussion
This chapter presents the results of the proof-of-concept tests conducted with
the CF model. The results were obtained through running the scenarios de-
scribed in Chapter 4 through the model described in Chapter 5. One goal
of this thesis is to analyze the scenarios qualitatively and quantitatively,
this chapter performs such an analysis. Another goal is to analyze the rela-
tions between business actors through modeling. This chapter performs this
analysis through looking at the quantitative consequences of business actor
relations.
6.1 Introduction
The results of the proof-of-concept tests are presented in this chapter. The
proof-of-concept tests have been carried out by using the scenarios of Chap-
ter 4 as input to the CF model. The scenarios represent different business
and market situations. All scenarios are based on the technical model and the
Service Portfolio presented in Chapter 2. Altogether, the scenarios provide
nine different sets of input.
The tests presented in this chapter have two main purposes. Firstly, they
test the functionality of the CF model developed. Secondly, they provide
valuable insight into the profitability of the modeled Service Portfolio.
The results are presented grouped by the scenarios that have been valuated.
For each scenario, a brief summary of the input is given before the results
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are presented. The results are presented both with NPV results and graphs.
Supplementary graphs and financial statements can be found in the appen-
dices, referenced in the text where appropriate. A discussion of each set of
results is given at the end of each scenario section. A summary of the re-
sults, an analysis of business actor incentives, and an evaluation of the model
results can be found at the end of this chapter.
Unless otherwise noted, all results are obtained by optimizing the prices to
maximize the NPV from the Service Portfolio for the Service Provider.
6.2 Scenario 1: Monopoly
This section presents the results from the valuation of the Monopoly scenario.
The scenario has been valuated with all three market scenarios; pessimistic,
realistic, and optimistic. The main results are presented in this section,
supplementary graphs and results are found in Appendix C.
6.2.1 Scenario Input
This scenario represents a business situation with only one Content Provider,
where this Content Provider participates in the service platform. The concen-
tration of Content Providers is very low (there is only one), and the Content
Provider in the service platform has built up barriers to entry through the
service platform participation. Both these factors increase the bargaining
power of the Content Provider. This increased bargaining power leads to
a large Lerner Index through the SCP equation, which again increases the
prices that the Content Provider charges for the use of its service enablers.
The consequences of this are explored in the following sections.
The NPV threshold is set to 0 for business actors 1 to 4 in this scenario.
Recall from Chapter 4 that the Content Providers have no NPV threshold in
this model.
6.2.2 CF Model Results
Table 6.1 presents the net present value of participating in the Service Plat-
form for all business actors involved. The Original-column contains results
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Pessimistic Realistic Optimistic
Business Actor Original Post Original Post Original Post
BA1, SP 7.1 5.7 262.7 262.7 554.3 554.3
BA2, CtxtP (2.9) 0.4 44.0 44.0 97.8 97.8
BA3, NP 9.4 7.2 295.9 295.9 623.2 623.2
BA4, IdP (0.2) 0.1 83.4 83.4 178.5 178.5
BA5, CP (8.8) (8.8) 44.2 44.2 123.4 123.4
Total 4.6 4.6 730.2 730.2 1577.2 1577.2
Table 6.1: CF model results with Scenario 1: Monopoly. All figures in million
NOK.
before Phase Post-1 is run. The Post-column presents the results after this
phase has completed its transformations. Hence, the Post-column shows the
results after the revenue share matrix has been adjusted to reach a solution
feasible for all business actors.
Service Pessimistic Realistic Optimistic
S1 4.02 2.11 1.77
S2 4.02 2.11 1.77
S3 4.05 2.12 1.79
S4 3.07 1.59 1.37
S5 3.04 1.60 1.35
S6 3.70 0.40 0.37
S7 3.70 0.43 0.40
Table 6.2: Service prices with Scenario 1: Monopoly.
Table 6.2 presents the prices for all services for this scenario. The revenue
share matrices of this scenario are shown in Figure C.4 in Appendix C. Recall
that the revenue share matrix contains percentage values of business actors
1-4, and a per-service-instance price for the Content Provider(s).
Pessimistic Market Scenario
For the pessimistic market scenario, the original NPV outcomes for business
actors 1-4 are close to zero. The NPV outcome for the Content Provider is
negative 8.8 million. After the redistribution, the Context Provider (BA2)
and the Identity Provider (BA4) obtain a positive NPV, above their NPV
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threshold of 0. As can be seen from the results, the NPV of the Content
Provider is not adjusted. The total NPV from the Service Portfolio is 4.6
million. Note that the total NPV is the same before and after the redistribu-
tion, as the only change between these two columns is an adjustment of the
revenue share matrix. This adjustment does not affect the total cash flow.
Figure C.4 in Appendix C shows the original and adjusted revenue share
matrix.
From the prices in Table 6.2, it can be seen that the prices of S6 and S7
are above the max price for these services. Hence, there are no sales for
these two services. The Service Provider does not find it profitable to sell
these services with the pessimistic market scenario. This affects the Content
Provider, which has fixed costs and R&D investments related to the Content
Provision (Information) service enabler, only required by S6 and S7. The
max prices for all services can be found in Figure B.1 in Appendix B.
Figure 6.1 shows the net cash flow for all business actors before and after the
redistribution of revenue. As can be seen from the graphs and the figures in
Table 6.1, the revenue share of the Service Provider and the Network Provider
is reduced, while it is increased for the Context Provider and the Identity
Provider.
The significant drop in net cash flow at t = 3 should also be noted in Fig-
ure 6.1. This drop is due to the introduction of competition on a disruptive
technology. In the pessimistic market scenario, this is modeled by a large
loss of demand to competition, and a significant drop in prices to counter the
competition. Together, this constitutes a severe impact to the net cash flow
of all business actors.
Realistic Market Scenario
As can be seen from Table 6.1, the results are better for all business ac-
tors with the realistic market scenario. This is due to the improved market
outlook, which increases the total revenue from the Service Portfolio. For
business actors 1-4, this increases their revenue as they receive the same per-
centage as with the original results of the pessimistic market scenario. It
also increases the revenue of the Content Provider, as the total number of
service instances sold increases. Recall that the Content Provider is paid on
a per-service-instance basis, with its bargaining power and marginal costs
deciding the price of its service enablers.
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(a) Net cash flow, original
(b) Net cash flow, after redistribution
Figure 6.1: Net cash flow for all business actors in Scenario 1: Monopoly, with the
pessimistic market scenario.
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(a) Sales
(b) Net Cash Flow
Figure 6.2: Sales and Net Cash flow for all business actors in Scenario 1: Monopoly,
with the realistic market scenario.
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No redistribution of revenue is necessary for this scenario combination, as the
original results have NPVs above the respective thresholds for all business
actors. Hence, the results in the Original- and Post-column of Table 6.1 are
identical.
The graphs in Figure 6.2 show the sales and net cash flow for all business
actors in the realistic market scenario. The financial statement for the Service
Provider can be found in Appendix C, Figure C.1. This statement is useful for
understanding how the net present value for each business actor is calculated.
Optimistic Market Scenario
The optimistic market scenario provides even better results for all business
actors than the previous two market scenarios. The total NPV from the Ser-
vice Portfolio has amounted to 1577.2 million. No redistribution of revenue
is necessary with this market scenario, as the original values are well within
the NPV thresholds.
6.2.3 Discussion
By comparing the results from the three market scenarios, it can be seen that
the results are promising for all business actors in the realistic and optimistic
market scenarios. The final results from the pessimistic market scenarios
satisfy the NPV thresholds for business actors 1-4, but predict a negative
NPV for the Content Provider.
The Service Provider and the Network Provider have the largest NPVs from
the Service Portfolio for all scenarios, significantly larger than for the other
business actors. This is due to their participation in all services through
their essential service enablers. Their participation in all services has two
important consequences. Firstly, they receive a percentage of the revenue
from all services. Secondly, the revenue share increases with the business
actor’s marginal production costs, and these two business actors have an on
average higher marginal production costs than the other business actors. The
larger revenue share more than outweighs the higher fixed costs and R&D
investments these two business actors have. The resulting revenue share
matrices are shown in Figure C.4 in Appendix C.
From the prices in Table 6.2, it can also be seen that the prices are affected
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by the market scenarios. The more optimistic the market scenario, the lower
the prices will be.
6.3 Scenario 2: Oligopoly
This section presents the results from the valuation of the Oligopoly scenario.
The scenario has been valuated with all three market scenarios; pessimistic,
realistic, and optimistic. The main results are presented in this section,
supplementary graphs and results are found in Appendix D.
6.3.1 Scenario Input
This scenario represents a business situation with three Content Providers,
with all Content Providers participating in the service platform. The concen-
tration of Content Providers is lower than for the Monopoly Scenario, but the
Content Providers have still built up barriers to entry through participating
in the service platform. With this scenario, the Service Provider will have to
choose among the Content Providers for the three Content Provision service
enablers, as they all provide all three.
In the Oligopoly scenario, the NPV threshold for the Context Provider is set
to 70 million, as described in Chapter 4.
6.3.2 CF Model Results
Table 6.3 presents the net present value of participating in the Service Plat-
form for all business actors involved. The Original-column contains results
before Phase Post-1 is run. The Post-column presents the results after this
phase has completed its transformations. Hence, the Post-column shows the
results after the revenue share matrix has been adjusted to reach a solution
feasible for all business actors.
Table 6.2 presents the prices for all services for this scenario. The revenue
share matrices of this scenario are shown in Figure D.2 in Appendix D. The
revenue share matrix shows that the Content Providers deliver one service
enabler each. This is because all Content Providers have the same value of
their Lerner index. Hence, the Content Provider with the lowest marginal
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Pessimistic Realistic Optimistic
Business Actor Original Post Original Post Original Post
BA1, SP 7.9 NA 275.4 265.1 585.3 585.3
BA2, CtxtP (2.7) NA 46.0 75.8 102.5 102.5
BA3, NP 10.3 NA 309.4 293.7 656.1 656.1
BA4, IdP 0.0 NA 87.9 84.0 189.4 189.4
BA5, CP (5.3) NA 7.1 7.1 28.2 28.2
BA6, CP (5.9) NA (0.1) (0.1) 9.6 9.6
BA7, CP (6.4) NA 0.9 0.9 9.3 9.3
Total (2.1) NA 726.6 726.6 1580.4 1580.4
Table 6.3: CF model results with Scenario 1: Oligopoly. All figures in million
NOK.
Service Pessimistic Realistic Optimistic
S1 3.95 2.11 1.72
S2 3.95 2.11 1.72
S3 3.98 2.11 1.74
S4 3.00 1.58 1.32
S5 2.97 1.58 1.30
S6 4.20 0.35 0.33
S7 4.20 0.39 0.36
Table 6.4: Service prices with Scenario 2: Oligopoly.
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cost for each service enabler is chosen. Recall the Content Provider marginal
cost data in Chapter 4.
Pessimistic Market Scenario
For the pessimistic market scenario, the original NPV results for business
actors 1 to 4 are similar to those of the Monopoly scenario. In this scenario
however, the NPV of the Context Provider needs to be above the threshold
of 70 million for the solution to satisfy the constraints. The total revenue
from the Service Portfolio is not large enough to satisfy the NPV thresholds
of all business actors, and hence no feasible solution can be found.
Like with the Monopoly scenario, the prices of S6 and S7 are above the max
prices for these services. BA7 delivers the Content Provision service enabler
to these services, and does not deliver any other service enablers. Hence,
this Content Provider incurs with fixed costs and R&D investments without
earning any revenue in return.
Realistic Market Scenario
As with the Monopoly scenario, the results for the realistic market scenario
are better for all business actors. With this scenario combination however,
the revenue share matrix needs to be adjusted to satisfy the NPV threshold of
the Context Provider. The original and redistributed revenue share matrices
can be found in Figure D.2 in Appendix D. This redistribution of revenue is
also shown in Figure 6.3. Notice the increase in net cash flow for the Context
Provider, BA2.
With the Oligopoly scenario, the bargaining power of the Content Providers
is reduced due to the reduced concentration. This results in a lower Lerner
index for the Content Providers, and thereby lower mark ups over price. As
apposed to with the Monopoly ccenario, two Content Providers now have a
negative NPV from the Service Portfolio with the realistic market scenario.
Optimistic Market Scenario
With the optimistic market scenario, all business actors are predicted a pos-
itive NPV. The total NPV from the Service Portfolio now amounts to 1580.4
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(a) Net cash flow
(b) Net cash flow, after redistribution
Figure 6.3: Net cash flow for all business actors in Scenario 2: Oligopoly, with the
realistic market scenario.
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million. No redistribution of revenue is necessary, as the NPV values for all
business actors are above the NPV thresholds.
When comparing the NPVs of the Content Providers, it can be seen that the
NPV of BA5 is higher than for the other Content Providers. This is because
this Content Provider sells a larger number of service enabler instances by
participating in the production of services 1, 2 and 3. The fixed costs of the
Content Providers are identical, but the revenue for BA5 is larger than for
the two other Content Providers.
6.3.3 Discussion
With the Oligopoly scenario, it is not possible to reach a feasible solution
with the pessimistic market scenario. This is because the total NPV from
the Service Portfolio is not large enough to satisfy the NPV thresholds of all
business actors. The results from the realistic and optimistic market scenarios
however, satisfy the constraints.
As with the Monopoly scenario, and for the same reasons, the Service Provider
and the Network Provider have the largest NPVs from the Service Portfolio
for all scenarios.
From Table 6.2 and Table 6.4 it can be seen that the prices in the Oligopoly
scenario are slightly lower than for the Monopoly scenario. This is be-
cause the marginal costs of producing one service instance are lower with
the Oligopoly scenario due to the reduced bargaining power of the Content
Providers. With lower marginal production costs, the Service Providers finds
it profitable to lower prices to sell more service instances.
6.4 Scenario 3: Free Market
This section presents the results from the valuation of the Free Market sce-
nario. The scenario has been valuated with all three market scenarios; pes-
simistic, realistic, and optimistic. The main results are presented in this
section, supplementary graphs and results are found in Appendix E.
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6.4.1 Scenario Input
This scenario represents a situation with ten Content Providers, with none
of the Content Providers participating in the service platform. The con-
centration of Content Provider is lower than for the previous two scenarios,
and the Content Providers have not built up any barriers to entry. As with
the Oligopoly scenario, the Service Provider will have to choose among the
Content Providers for the three Content Provision service enablers.
In the Free Market scenario, the NPV threshold for business actors 1 to 4 is
set to 0, as described in Chapter 4.
As the Content Providers in this scenario are not part of the service platform,
they do not have the 1 million investment costs for the first year as they do
in the other two scenarios.
6.4.2 CF Model Results
Pessimistic Realistic Optimistic
Business Actor Original Post Original Post Original Post
BA1, SP 8.5 7.3 285.8 285.8 610.6 610.6
BA2, CtxtP (2.6) 0.4 47.5 47.5 106.4 106.4
BA3, NP 10.9 9.0 320.4 320.4 683.1 683.1
BA4, IdP (1.5) 0.4 90.0 90.0 196.7 196.7
BA5, CP (5.7) (5.7) (5.1) (5.1) (4.1) (4.1)
BA6, CP (5.7) (5.7) (5.4) (5.4) (5.0) (5.0)
BA7, CP (5.7) (5.7) (5.3) (5.3) (4.8) (4.8)
Total 0.0 0.0 729.7 729.7 1584.5 1584.5
Table 6.5: CF model results with Scenario 1: Free Market. All figures in million
NOK.
Table 6.5 presents the net present value of participating in the Service Plat-
form for all business actors involved. The Original-column contains results
before Phase Post-1 is run. The Post-column presents the results after this
phase has completed its transformations. Hence, the Post-column shows the
results after the revenue share matrix has been adjusted to reach a solution
feasible for all business actors.
Table 6.6 presents the prices for all services for this scenario. The revenue
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Service Pessimistic Realistic Optimistic
S1 3.89 2.08 1.72
S2 3.89 2.08 1.72
S3 3.92 2.10 1.72
S4 2.95 1.58 1.29
S5 2.92 1.56 1.29
S6 3.97 0.32 0.30
S7 6.73 0.35 0.33
Table 6.6: Service prices with Scenario 3: Free Market.
share matrices of this scenario are shown in Figure E.2 in Appendix E. The
revenue share matrices show that Content Providers BA5, BA6 and BA7
deliver one service enabler each. This is because all Content Providers have
the same value of their Lerner index. Hence, the Content Provider with the
lowest marginal cost for each service enabler is chosen. Recall the Content
Provider marginal cost data of Chapter 4.
Pessimistic Market Scenario
From the results in Table 6.5 we see that a feasible solution is found for the
pessimistic market scenario after redistribution. The original and adjusted
revenue share matrices are shown in Figure E.2 in Appendix E.
Like with the other two business situation scenarios, the prices of S6 and S7
are above the max price for the pessimistic market scenario. Hence, BA7
incurs fixed and investment costs, but collects no revenue.
Realistic Market Scenario
With the realistic market scenario, no adjustments are necessary to satisfy
the NPV thresholds of the business actors. Figure 6.4 shows the net cash
flow of all business actors for the realistic market scenario.
The bargaining power of the Content Providers is significantly less with the
Free Market scenario than with the two other scenarios. This is due to the
reduced concentration and lack of barriers to entry. From Figure 6.5 it can
be seen that the net cash flow for the selected Content Providers is negative
throughout the time span of the Service Portfolio. This is because the mark
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Figure 6.4: Net cash flow for all business actors in Scenario 3: Free Market, with
the realistic market scenario.
Figure 6.5: Net cash flow for selected Content Providers in Scenario 3: Free Market,
with the realistic market scenario.
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up they are able to charge over marginal cost is not enough to make up for
their fixed costs and investments.
Optimistic Market Scenario
The NPV outcomes for business actors 1 to 4 are even better with the Free
Market scenarios than with the other two business situation scenarios. For
the Content Providers however, the NPV from participating in the Service
Portfolio production is negative.
6.4.3 Discussion
The most significant difference between the Free Market scenario and the
other two business situation scenarios is the poorer result for the Content
Providers. For all of the market scenarios, the NPV results for the Content
Providers are negative. This is due to their reduced bargaining power, which
again reduces the mark up they are able to charge over marginal costs. The
reduced investment costs from not participating in the service platform are
not enough to make up for the reduced bargaining power.
The effects of bargaining power through the concentration and barrier to
entry-variables are investigated in the next section.
6.5 Business Situation Sensitivity
This section investigates the consequences of the different business situa-
tion that the three main scenarios represent. From the previously presented
results, it can be seen that the market form in the scenarios affects the prof-
itability of the Service Portfolio for all business actors. The Content Providers
seem to be particularly sensitive to the market form in the scenarios.
Recall the SCP equation from Chapter 3
L = β1CON + β2BE
The result of this SCP calculation is shown in the right-most column of
Table 6.7. Recall also how the Lerner index is related to marginal cost and
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Scenario CP Revenue % CON BE L
Monopoly 10.7% 1.00 1 0.60
Oligopoly 7.6% 0.33 1 0.40
Free Market 5.0% 0.10 0 0.03
Table 6.7: Key business situation data for the three scenarios.
price
L =
(
P −MC
P
)
Hence, the Lerner index calculated with the SCP equation for the different
scenarios determines how much the Content Providers can mark up their
price over marginal cost. This mark up needs to be large enough to cover
fixed costs and R&D investments if the Content Providers are to find the
Service Portfolio profitable.
From Table 6.7 it can also be seen that the percentage of total revenue going
to the Content Providers decreases significantly when their bargaining power,
and hence Lerner index, decreases. This is because their bargaining power
and their marginal costs determine the price they can charge for their service
enablers. For all three scenarios, the marginal costs of the selected Content
Providers are the same. Hence, with decreasing bargaining power, the prices
of their service enablers decrease. The decreasing prices affect their share of
the total revenue negatively.
By examining the figures in Table 6.7 and the NPV results from the previous
sections, it can be seen that the Content Provider in the Monopoly scenario
is predicted the most profitable outcome from the Service Portfolio. For the
Oligopoly scenario, the situation is somewhat worse. For the Free Market
scenario, the Content Providers are predicted a negative NPV with all market
scenarios. The opposite is true for business actors 1-4, where the Free Market
scenario predicts the most profitable outcome.
Another result that should be pointed is the identical original revenue share
matrices for business actors 1-4 for all business scenarios, paired with all
market scenarios. This is because the revenue share of these business actors
is determined by their percentage of the total marginal production cost less
the production costs of the Content Providers. Their marginal production
costs are identical for all scenarios. Hence, the way these business actors
share the remaining revenue does not change from scenario to scenario.
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6.6 Business Actor Incentives
The CF model developed in this thesis has introduced a different revenue
share scheme than Langøygard’s (2006) model. It also accounts for the bar-
gaining power of Content Providers, and the effects of participating in the
service platform. This section will investigate what incentives this gives the
business actors.
6.6.1 Pricing
One problem with the revenue share scheme in Langøygard’s (2006) model
was that all business actors except for the Service Provider would price at
minimum price when optimizing the prices for their NPV from the Service
Portfolio. This was because they were paid on a per-service-instance basis,
and thus wanted to maximize the number of service instances sold. The total
revenue from the Service Portfolio was of less importance.
The results presented previously in this chapter have been from setting the
prices to maximize the revenue of the Service Provider. This section inves-
tigates the outcome when setting the prices to maximize the revenue of the
Network Provider. The Network Provider is chosen because this business
actor participates in the production of all services, and hence has prefer-
ences for the prices of all services. The optimization is run with Scenario 1:
Oligopoly, with all market scenarios.
Pessimistic Realistic Optimistic
Business Actor Original Post Original Post Original Post
BA1, SP 7.9 NA 275.4 265.1 585.3 585.3
BA2, CtxtP (2.7) NA 46.0 75.8 102.5 102.5
BA3, NP 10.3 NA 309.4 293.7 656.1 656.1
BA4, IdP 0.0 NA 87.9 84.0 189.4 189.4
BA5, CP (5.3) NA 7.1 7.1 28.2 28.2
BA6, CP (5.9) NA (0.1) (0.1) 9.6 9.6
BA7, CP (6.4) NA 0.9 0.9 9.3 9.3
Total (2.1) NA 726.6 726.6 1580.4 1580.4
Table 6.8: CF model results with Scenario 1: Oligopoly. All figures in million
NOK. Optimized for BA3.
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Service Pessimistic Realistic Optimistic
S1 3.95 2.11 1.72
S2 3.95 2.11 1.72
S3 3.98 2.11 1.74
S4 3.00 1.58 1.32
S5 2.97 1.58 1.30
S6 4.20 0.35 0.33
S7 4.20 0.39 0.36
Table 6.9: Service prices with Scenario 2: Oligopoly. Optimized for BA3.
The results of the optimization are found in Table 6.8 and Table 6.9. When
comparing these two tables to the original optimization results in Table 6.3
and Table 6.4, it can be seen that the results are exactly the same. Hence, the
revenue share scheme developed in thesis aligns the incentives of the Service
Provider and the Network Provider. This is important because all business
actors in the service platform will have to agree on the price of their services.
When the incentives are aligned, reaching an agreement becomes easier.
6.6.2 Service Platform Participation
Business actors 1 to 4 participate in the service platform for all scenarios.
Because the CF model models a content provisioning portfolio and accounts
for the bargaining power of Content Providers, these are modeled both par-
ticipating and not participating in the service platform.
From the results presented in this chapter, it is clear that the Content
Provider participating in the service platform in the Monopoly scenario faces
the most profitable situation. Furthermore, the Content Providers in the
Oligopoly scenario face a more profitable situation than the Content Providers
in the Free Market scenario. If one of the Content Providers in the Free Mar-
ket scenario were given the opportunity to participate in the service platform
and paying the investment costs for this participation, the model results in-
dicate that the Content Provider would seize this opportunity. Thus, the
model results indicate that the Content Providers have a desire to partic-
ipate in the service platform. For the other business actors however, the
opposite is the case. They would prefer to buy Content Provision service
enablers from a large number of Content Providers outside the service plat-
form. Consequently, the model results indicate that the Content Providers
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and the rest of the business actors have different preferences on this point.
It should also be taken into account that Content Providers outside the ser-
vice platform most likely will have better opportunities to sell service en-
ablers to multiple service platforms. This aspect is not accounted for in the
CF model as it only valuates the profitability of the Service Portfolio. Such
opportunities may increase the profitability of not participating in the service
platform.
6.7 Discussion
There are a few key properties and assumptions of the model that should be
considered when evaluating the results presented herein. Firstly, the model
assumes perfect information regarding the costs of the business actors. This
is necessary to determine the revenue share and the financial figures for each
business actor. In a real business situation it might be the case that the
business actors do not wish to reveal their costs to each other. The CF
model should then be used with approximated values.
Secondly, the SCP equation used to quantify bargaining power is very sensi-
tive to the β-values. The CF model has been tested with β-values of 0.3, as
discussed in Chapter 3 and in the phase descriptions of Chapter 5. Prefer-
ably, these values should be determined by applying econometric techniques
on situations similar to the one modeled. Such a determination is out of
scope of this thesis, but should be conducted if the CF model framework is
applied to other service portfolios. Furthermore, it should be noted that the
SCP implementation is aligned with economic theory on the subject, but not
checked against statistical data on content provider pricing.
Thirdly, the CF model in this thesis implements only one pricing scheme
as opposed to the two pricing schemes implemented by Langøygard (2006).
The reason for this is the limitations of the Solver add-in used to solve the
optimization problems. When investigating Langøygard’s model, it was con-
cluded that the Solver add-in was not able to solve the problem with two
pricing schemes in a satisfactory manner. The Solver did not reach optimal
solution unless strict restraints were imposed on the prices in the fixed pric-
ing scheme. Langøygard chose to impose such restraints to be able to use
two pricing schemes. This CF model chooses to impose less strict restraints,
but limits the number of pricing schemes to one.
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Fourthly, the CF model in this thesis implements a fixed decrease in prices
set together with the scenario variables. This reduces the liberty of deter-
mining prices for the business actor setting prices to optimize its outcome
of the project. Preferably, the CF model should implement all necessary
market mechanisms, and then let the business actors set price without any
restrictions except for regulation. However, extensive trials showed that the
Solver add-in was not able to arrive at the optimal solution when the prices
of all services for all years were the subject of optimization. Consequently,
the CF model lets the optimizer set the prices of all services only for the first
year of operation. In the following years, the prices are determined by the
price decrease variables. This way of determining prices is the same as in the
model of Langøygard (2006).
6.8 Summary
This chapter has presented the results of valuating the Service Portfolio with
the CF model. The business situation scenarios representing the market
forms monopoly, oligopoly and free market provided input describing the
business situation and the business actor strategies. The market scenar-
ios pessimistic, realistic and optimistic provided input regarding the market
development. The business and market scenarios have been combined to
produce a total of nine different sets of input. The technical model of the
Service Portfolio presented in Chapter 2 has been the same for all sets of
input, except for the varying number of Content Providers and their service
enablers.
The results of the CF model valuation shows that the predicted outcome
for the Service Provider, Context Provider, Network Provider and Identity
Provider look promising. Their NPV from the Service Portfolio varies slightly
from market scenario to market scenario. Overall, results for the optimistic
and realistic market scenarios predict positive NPV values for all these busi-
ness actors. With the pessimistic market scenario, the model is able to reach
a feasible solution for all scenarios, except with the Oligopoly scenario where
the Context Provider has a NPV threshold of 70 million.
For the Content Providers, the results are promising with the Monopoly sce-
nario. The NPV outcome is somewhat worse for the Oligopoly scenario, and
the model predicts a negative NPV for all selected Content Providers with
all market scenarios in the Free Market scenario. The CF model quantifi-
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cation of bargaining power significantly affects the outcome for the Content
Providers, and their outcome has been shown to be highly dependent on the
business scenarios.
The nine different sets of input provided to the CF model in the proof-of-
concept tests also test the functionality of the model. The model seems to
work as desired, and all phases seem to conduct their transformations in
a satisfactory manner. Bargaining power is accounted for in the model by
quantifying the bargaining power of the Content Providers from structural
parameters. The revenue share agreement is devised in such a way that the
business actors deciding the price of services have their incentives aligned.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion
This section concludes this thesis. The main results are examined and com-
pared to the problem formulation. It is shown that a solution has been
proposed to the problem formulation, and that answers have been proposed
to all defined research questions. Concluding comments on the CF model are
also given. Moreover, this section suggests important areas for future work.
7.1 Results
The purpose of this thesis has been to analyze a chosen set of communica-
tion and IT service portfolios, with an emphasis on cash flow optimization
and business actor positions and incentives. The quantitative framework
developed for the analysis has been based on the frameworks developed by
Langøygard (2006) and Zoric & Lassen (2005). The thesis set out to ana-
lyze and improve these models. More specifically, four important research
questions were identified in the problem formulation:
• How can scenarios be used to represent business models and business
strategies?
• How can the scenarios be analyzed qualitatively and quantitatively?
• How can the business actor positions be analyzed in the scenarios?
• How can the relations between business actors be analyzed through
modeling?
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In Chapter 4, scenarios are developed to represent business models and busi-
ness strategies. Three scenarios describing three different business situa-
tions are created. These scenarios represent the market forms of monopoly,
oligopoly and free market. Furthermore, three market scenarios are devel-
oped to account for different market developments. In all scenarios, the
participating business actors are modeled with different business models and
business strategies. The technical model is described in Chapter 2, and kept
constant throughout the scenarios to focus on the business situation. The
business actor strategies are modeled emphasizing two main strategic mat-
ters. Firstly, the scenarios include the strategic decision of participation in
the service platform for the Content Providers. Secondly, the strategic effect
of net present value thresholds is accounted for through setting this param-
eter for certain business actors.
The main work of this thesis has been the quantitative and qualitative anal-
ysis of the scenarios developed in Chapter 4. The technical and economic
theory investigated in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 provides a necessary back-
ground for the analysis performed. Furthermore, the bargaining power of
business actors in the scenarios is investigated. However, the quantitative
CF model is the main contribution of this thesis. The CF model takes the
different scenarios as input and performs a quantitative valuation of the Ser-
vice Portfolio for all business actors. The CF model accounts for market
parameters, the business situation and the strategic preferences of business
actors. The results from the proof-of-concept test presented in Chapter 6 pro-
vide valuable insight into the profitability of the Service Portfolio. Moreover,
the results give valuable insight into the consequences of changing business
situation or market parameters, and into the functionality of the model.
Business actor positions have been analyzed through accounting for bargain-
ing power in the CF model. Relevant economic and strategic theory has
been examined to investigate how bargaining power could be accounted for
in the model. The drivers of bargaining power in Service Platforms have
been identified, and the business actor positions defined according to this.
The thesis finds that barriers to entry created through participation in the
service platform are a likely driver of bargaining power. Furthermore, the
concentration of Content Providers is thought to be an essential parameter
affecting their bargaining power.
Relations between business actors have been analyzed in the model through
implementing a new revenue share model. The model of Langøygard (2006),
on which the CF model of this thesis is built, had some shortcomings when
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dealing with the revenue share agreement. The CF model of this thesis pro-
poses a new approach to the revenue share agreement, by accounting for
bargaining power and business actor positions. This proposed revenue share
agreement aligns the incentives of the business actors, except for the Con-
tent Providers. Strategic relations between business actors are accounted for
through introducing a new phase to the model that redistributes the revenue
after the rest of the model has finished the valuation. This redistribution
tries to propose a solution that is acceptable to all business actors.
7.2 CF Model Comments
When using a quantitative model like the one developed in this thesis, it is
important to remember that the results are never any better than the input
that is provided. If the CF model framework is to be applied to other service
portfolios, care should be given to the quality of the input parameters. Some
input parameters are relatively easy to predict, such as the population in the
area where the services are offered. Other parameters are harder to estimate,
such as the mean demand for each service.
Measurement of bargaining power is done quantitatively in the CF model.
The investigation of economic theory shows that the approach chosen is con-
sistent with such theory. However, no empirical investigation of the rela-
tionship between structural properties and bargaining power is conducted.
Econometric techniques could be applied to industry data to examine if the
approach chosen in thesis is appropriate. Moreover, further investigation into
the β-parameters of the SCP equation would serve the model well.
The CF model of this thesis develops a revenue share matrix based on busi-
ness actor marginal costs and the bargaining power of Content Providers.
However, such revenue share agreements between business actors will always
be subject to negotiation. This should be kept in mind when using the results
from the model. A redistribution of revenue according to strategic parame-
ters, such as a net present value threshold, is also implemented in the model.
This implementation shows that a solution acceptable to all business actors
can be reached by modifying the revenue share agreement from the original
valuation. However, such modifications of the agreement will also be sub-
ject to negotiation in real world service portfolio projects. Nonetheless, the
implementation in the CF model contributes by showing that an agreement
can be reached.
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The Service Portfolio modeled in this thesis is a content provisioning service
portfolio. Because of this, the Content Providers are treated separately from
the other business actors. This should be altered if the CF model framework
is applied to another type of service portfolio.
The Microsoft Excel Solver add-in used to solve the optimization problems in
the model imposes two main constraints. Firstly, it was found that optimal
solutions could be found only with one pricing scheme. Secondly, the Solver
add-in limited the price dynamics of the model. Preferably, the market mech-
anisms should be included in the model, and the business actors should be
able to price all services freely throughout the time span of the valuation.
However, fixed price increases/decreases have been implemented to bring the
model to a level of complexity solvable by the add-in.
Despite the difficulties encountered when developing the model, and the lim-
itations of the valuation, a solution has been proposed to the problem formu-
lation. The four main research questions have all been solved by the proposed
CF model and the qualitative analyses. Future work to improve the model
is discussed in the next section.
7.3 Suggestions for Future Work
The limitations of the model have been discussed in the previous section.
It is clear that the model could benefit from being implemented in an en-
vironment capable of solving more complex problems. This would allow for
the introduction of more pricing schemes than the one implemented in the
current model. Moreover, such an environment would preferably also allow
more flexible pricing opportunities in the optimization problem.
It has also been pointed out that an empirical investigation of the relation-
ship between structural properties and bargaining power in service platforms
would benefit the model. Such an investigation is an interesting area for
future work. However, such an investigation would need extensive data from
previous experience and hence probably have to be carried out by an experi-
enced industry business actor.
It would be interesting to compare the results of the model to real world
data. Econometric techniques could be applied to the results and previous
experience to examine the correctness of the CF model output. In the long
run, the best test of the model would be comparing the results of the model
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with experience from launching the same service portfolio in the market.
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UML class diagrams
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Figure A.1: UML class diagram of service enablers
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Figure A.2: UML class diagram of services
138
Figure A.3: UML class diagram of business actors
139
Figure A.4: UML class diagram showing service and service enabler relationships.
Services 1 through 3.
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Figure A.5: UML class diagram showing service and service enabler relationships.
Services 4 through 7.
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Appendix B
General Variables
142
Figure B.1: General Variables, input to all scenario valuations.
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Appendix C
Results from Scenario 1:
Monopoly
144
Figure C.1: Results for BA1, the Service Provider with the monopoly scenario and
realistic market scenario. The illustration shows the income statement, the book
value of assets, the cash flow statement, and the net present value of the project.
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(a) Sales
(b) Net Cash Flow
Figure C.2: Sales and Net Cash flow for all business actors in Scenario 1: Monopoly,
with the realistic market scenario.
146
(a) Sales, original (b) Sales, after redistribution
(c) Net Cash Flow, original (d) Net Cash Flow, after redistribution
Figure C.3: Sales and Net Cash Flow for all business actors in Scenario 1:
Monopoly, with the pessimistic market scenario.
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(a) Original revenue share matrix, all market scenarios
(b) Revenue share matrix after redistribution, pessimistic market scenario
Figure C.4: Revenue share matrices of Scenario 1: Monopoly.
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Appendix D
Results from Scenario 2:
Oligopoly
(a) Sales, original (b) Sales, after redistribution
(c) Net Cash Flow, original (d) Net Cash Flow, after redistribution
Figure D.1: Sales and Net Cash Flow for all business actors in Scenario 2:
Oligopoly, with the realistic market scenario.
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(a) Original revenue share matrix, all market scenarios
(b) Revenue share matrix after redistribution, realistic market scenario
Figure D.2: Revenue share matrices of Scenario 2: Oligopoly.
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Appendix E
Results from Scenario 3: Free
Market
(a) Sales, all BAs (b) Sales, Content Providers
(c) Net Cash Flow, all BAs (d) Net Cash Flow, Content Providers
Figure E.1: Sales and Net Cash Flow for all business actors in Scenario 2: Free
Market, with the realistic market scenario.
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(a) Original revenue share matrix, all market scenarios
(b) Revenue share matrix after redistribution, pessimistic market scenario
Figure E.2: Revenue share matrices of Scenario 3: Free Market.
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